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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of attention in the awareness of and response to pain makes it an important 
cognitive function to study in recurrent pain conditions (e.g., Cioffi, 1991; Compas & Boyer, 
2001; Eccleston, 1995a, 1995b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; 
Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997).  Attention is a critical component in the experience of pain, as it 
is involved in the process of orienting toward pain and appraising it as harmful or benign 
(Compas & Boyer, 2001; Eccleston, 1995b; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).  Attention 
continues to play an important role once pain has been detected, as it is involved in ongoing 
activities such as monitoring subsequent internal and environmental events, and facilitating 
pain responses (Compas & Boyer, 2001; Eccleston, 1995a; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).   It 
has been suggested that differences in these attentional processes are associated with the 
degree to which pain is perceived as signaling harm to an individual, and the extent to which 
an individual is fearful of pain (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).   
Difficulties in attentional processing have been hypothesized to have a role in the 
maintenance of recurrent abdominal pain (RAP; Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, 
et al., 1997).  RAP is a pediatric condition in which three or more episodes of abdominal pain 
occur over a period of at least three months and interfere with the child’s activities (Apley, 
1975).  Zeltzer and colleagues have suggested that children who experience RAP are 
hypervigilant for pain sensations, and once pain has been detected, are less able than healthy 
peers to disengage attention from pain, resulting in increased pain fear and anxiety, which 
 2 
further magnifies pain (Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997).  However, 
no study to date has compared children with RAP to pain-free children in their attentional 
response to pain.  Thus, a primary goal of this study is to compare children with RAP and 
pain-free children in their pattern of attentional orienting to physical threat.  The model 
proposed in this study draws upon theories of chronic pain and attention and is based on the 
integration of relevant findings from the adult and pediatric pain literature.  Further, this 
study will investigate the content specificity of attentional bias for physical threat stimuli by 
testing bias for other threatening information.  In addition, psychological correlates of 
attentional bias to physical threat will be investigated, including anxiety symptoms, current 
affect, and beliefs regarding the severity of abdominal pain threat.   
This paper first presents current models of pain, attention, and perceptions of pain 
threat, emphasizing the importance of attentional processing and threat perception in chronic 
pain conditions.  Research on biases for the selection of threatening stimuli for attention in 
adults and children with chronic pain is reviewed.    Also, because of the attentional bias 
toward threat that has been well-documented in anxiety disorders, research on attentional 
orienting in pediatric and adult anxiety disorder patients is considered. 
 
Models of Pain 
Acute, everyday pain signifies tissue damage and the need to prevent further damage.  
For example, acute pain signals protective reflexes to withdraw a hand rapidly from a hot 
stove and notifies the brain to organize adaptive behaviors, such as staying clear of the 
burner.  After injury, pain encourages reduced activity and behaviors that promote healing, 
which usually results in the lessening and ultimate disappearance of pain, and a return to 
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regular activities.  In this example, attending to pain sensations is adaptive for healthy 
functioning.  However, not all pain subsides with healing nor has an identifiable biological 
cause.  For chronic pain, the failure of purely biological explanations for symptoms has been 
widely reported.  In addition, associations among physical impairment, pain, and disability 
have been shown to be modest at best (e.g., Guite, 2001).  It is now recognized that the 
experience of pain includes dynamic and bidirectional relations between biological, 
psychological, and environmental components (Merskey, 1979).  A brief overview of the 
evolution of our understanding of pain follows. 
 
Traditional Biomedical Perspectives on Pain 
Traditional medicine had a dichotomous view in which symptoms were seen as either 
somatogenic or psychogenic.  When somatogenic, medical treatments were based on the 
principle of biomedical reductionism, in which a medical condition is reduced to a single 
etiology.  It was believed that pain signified tissue damage, and when no tissue damage could 
be ascertained, the condition was considered psychogenic.  Thus, accompanying features of 
chronic conditions, such as depression, sleep disturbance, and psychosocial disability, were 
considered reactions to a disease and therefore of secondary importance.  When these 
secondary reactions did not abate upon the disease’s cure, they were suspected to be of 
psychological origin.   
 
Gate Control Theory of Pain 
Failure of purely biological explanations to account for symptom variation is 
common in cases of chronic pain.  In the 1960s, dissatisfaction with the conventional model 
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of pain led to the formulation of the Gate Control Theory of pain (GCT) (Melzack & Casey, 
1968; Melzack & Wall, 1965).   GCT recognized that the experience of pain is an ongoing 
sequence of activities that are modifiable by a variety of excitatory and inhibitory influences, 
including ascending and descending central nervous system (CNS) activity.   
GCT posits gate-like mechanisms in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord that regulate 
the passing of information from the body to the brain.  When the body experiences tissue 
damage, pain receptors at the site send a signal via nerve fibers to the dorsal horn.  Here, the 
opening of the gates allows pain signals to continue their travel to the brain.  The opening of 
the gates is influenced by the body’s sensory-discriminative, motivational-affective, and 
cognitive-evaluative systems, which may act to inhibit, excite, or modulate the passage of 
pain information (Melzack & Casey, 1968).  In this way, GCT helps explain variations in 
pain experience that tissue damage cannot explain.  For example, severe injury experienced 
during a dangerous situation may not be perceived as painful until an individual has escaped 
to safety, as in the case of injuries experienced during wartime battles.  If the experience of 
pain were not delayed, the individual’s escape from danger might not be possible.  Thus, 
GCT posits that input from the brain regarding factors unrelated to tissue damage (as in the 
perception of a threatening situation) influence the pain experience.  GCT’s emphasis on the 
modulation of inputs in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord and the dynamic role of the brain in 
pain perception has resulted in the integration of psychological variables into current research 
on and treatment of pain (Drossman, 1996; Melzack, 2001; Turk, 1996).   
 
Current Perspectives on Recurrent Abdominal Pain 
Evidence for biological and psychological heterogeneity in disorders such as diabetes, 
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cancer, and inflammatory bowel disease led to George Engel’s proposal of a 
“biopsychosocial” model of illness (Engel, 1977, 1980).  Engel suggested that illness is the 
product of biological, psychological, and social subsystems interacting at multiple levels.  
According to this model, the intensity of symptoms and a patient’s response to them are 
influenced by a wide range of factors, such as the degree of tissue damage, as well as the 
patient’s attentional focus, mood, prior learning history, cultural background, environmental 
contingencies, social support, and financial resources.  Biopsychosocial models have further 
stimulated research on the contributions of psychosocial components to the etiology and 
maintenance of illness (Drossman, 1996; Turk, 1996). 
Recurrent abdominal pain (RAP) is the most common chronic pain complaint in 
children.  It is defined as having at least 3 episodes of abdominal pain in a three-month 
period, and is rarely associated with organic disease (Apley, 1975).  Patients with RAP report 
higher levels of emotional distress than their healthy peers (Garber, Zeman & Walker, 1990; 
Walker, Garber & Greene, 1993).  A biopsychosocial perspective on RAP integrates 
biological, psychological, and socio-contextual factors in reciprocal and dynamic interactions 
that cause and perpetuate pain (for reviews of these factors, see Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; 
Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997; Scharff, 1999; Walker, 1999).  This perspective is consistent with 
the GCT of pain.  Biological factors in RAP include physical pathology or physical changes 
in the gut that generate nociceptive signals transmitted to the brain.  Psychological factors 
include beliefs about pain developed from prior pain and illness experiences; attention to 
pain signals and appraisal of pain sensation, including interpretation of its meaning and one’s 
ability to cope with it; temperament; and emotional states.  These psychological factors are 
involved in the modulation of nociceptive signals from the gut.  Socio-contextual factors 
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include behavior of significant others (e.g., caregivers, teachers, and peers), which may shape 
children’s pain responses and beliefs by encouraging healthy and active responses to pain or 
adoption of a sick role, and by providing children with a model for pain behavior when 
responding to their own pain.  Thus, current views of RAP integrate multiple components in 
the experience of pain and pain-related disability. 
In discussions of the interruptive function of pain, Eccleston, Crombez and colleagues 
argue that pain interrupts and demands attention in order to promote escape from pain 
(Crombez, Baeyens, Vansteenwegen & Eelen, 1997; Eccleston, 1995a, 1995b; Eccleston & 
Crombez, 1999).  In their cognitive-affective model of the interruptive function of pain, these 
authors argue that pain has an attentional processing priority by activating a primitive 
defensive system that urges escape from somatic threat (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).  They 
suggested this function is normal and adaptive for short-lived pain, but is problematic in the 
case of chronic pain, in which escape from pain may not be possible (Aldrich, Eccleston, & 
Crombez, 2000; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).   
With respect to RAP, it has been proposed that children with RAP may be 
distinguished from healthy peers by their hypervigilance for abdominal pain (Zeltzer, Bursch, 
et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997), which may facilitate interruptability of attention 
toward ongoing activities by pain.  Once pain has been detected, children with RAP may be 
less able than peers to disengage attention from pain (Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, 
Bush, et al., 1997).  Furthermore, continuing participation in regular activities may require a 
high level of attentional effort in order to override the interruptive function of pain, and 
maintaining this attentional effort in response to chronic pain may be challenging over time 
(Compas & Boyer, 2001).  This may lead to more pain-related disability, which reduces the 
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availability of distracting information and thus may promote increased attention to pain 
(Walker, 1999).  Increased attention to pain also may result in greater fear and anxiety about 
pain ,which, in turn, magnifies pain sensations (Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et 
al., 1997).  Thus, attentional processes have important implications for regulating the 
experience of pain. 
 
Mechanisms of Attention 
 
Capacity Models of Attention 
Metaphorical accounts of attentional processing use analogies of a spotlight or zoom 
lens to describe the capability of attending to a limited number of events at any one time.  
These analogies reflect ideas described in capacity models of attention, which depict 
attention as a limited resource that can be allocated to the performance of tasks in the service 
of meeting current and future goals (Kahneman, 1973; Shiffrin, 1988).  Cognitive tasks 
require varying amounts of attentional effort for performance.  For example, attention may be 
automatically or environmentally directed toward certain information and events without 
conscious or deliberate effort (as when attention is drawn to a hand burning on a hot stove, or 
an approaching object in one’s path).  Conversely, large amounts of effortful attention are 
involved in tasks that require strategic planning and action, such as navigating novel or 
dangerous situations, and overcoming habitual behaviors.  Some tasks, such as learning to 
ride a bicycle, require diminishing amounts of effortful attention over time and with practice, 
leaving more attentional resources available for other simultaneous actions that require 
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effortful attention (e.g., Logan, 1992a, b; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977).  
 
Neurological Basis of Attentional Processes 
Imaging studies of neurological structures, including positron emission tomography 
(PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and depth electrical recordings, have 
contributed to our current understanding of the neurological basis of attention (e.g., Luck & 
Hillyard, 2000; Posner & DiGirolamo, 2000).  Three neural networks have been implicated 
in the process of attending to sensory input: a posterior system that allows attention to be 
disengaged and shifted to different locations, an executive anterior system that is involved in 
the detection of target stimuli, and a vigilance system that influences both the anterior and 
posterior networks by increasing the efficiency of orienting by the posterior system and 
suppressing activity in the anterior system.  These networks function together to facilitate 
detecting, engaging with, and disengaging attention from internal and external events. 
The posterior attention network involves portions of the parietal cortex, parts of the 
midbrain’s superior colliculus, and associated thalamic areas of the pulvinar nucleus.  
Current models of sensory orienting describe these brain areas working together to disengage 
attention from its current focus, bring attention to a target location in space, and restrict input 
to the indexed area (Posner, 1995). 
The executive anterior system is distributed among the mid-prefrontal cortex, 
including the anterior cingulate gyrus and the supplementary motor area.  This system is 
active in a wide variety of situations involving the detection of events and facilitation of 
conscious, effortful behavior (Posner & Petersen, 1990).  Detecting a target causes 
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interference in attention to other targets.  That is, multiple sensory input channels can be 
monitored simultaneously with little or with no interference, but when a target is detected, 
the probability of detection of a target on other channels is greatly restricted (Duncan, 1980).  
Conflict trials of the Stroop task (described below) produce activation within the anterior 
cingulate gyrus of the frontal midline, supporting this network’s role in executive control of 
target recognition and response (Posner & Rothbart, 1998).  
The vigilance system involves the locus coeruleus’s primary norepinephrine input to 
the cortex (Posner & Rothbart, 1992).  This system is activated when an individual is 
required to maintain an alert state, such as in the foreperiod of a reaction time task, and when 
attending to a source of signals while waiting for a target to occur (see Posner & Petersen, 
1990, for a review).  
Together, these three networks of the brain’s attention system work to facilitate 
responses to internal and external events.  A decrease in metabolic activation of the anterior 
cingulate has been demonstrated during maintenance of vigilance, reflecting the elimination 
of extraneous thoughts that might interfere with target detection.  The vigilance system 
further enhances target detection through the locus coeruleus’s primary norepinephrine input 
to areas of the parietal cortex, where it connects with the posterior system (Morrison & 
Foote, 1986).   These functions result in an increase in the speed of object recognition 
(Posner, 1978).   
 
Attentional Engagement and Interruption 
When attention is oriented toward a particular location, information at that location is 
processed with increased efficiency, while processing of information at other locations is less 
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efficient (Posner & Rothbart, 1992).  This effect of orienting toward a location has been 
described as selection, and continued selection of a location or stimulus has been described 
as attentional engagement (Posner & Rothbart, 1992).  In order to promote functioning in 
unpredictable environments, attentional processing must balance the need for attentional 
engagement with information pertaining to a current goal against the need for interruption by 
incoming information, which may be appraised as having a higher priority for attentional 
selection and continued engagement (Allport, 1989).  It has been suggested that either or both 
of these processes may be impaired in patients with RAP and other chronic pain conditions, 
who may frequently select pain for attention and have difficulty disengaging their attention  
from it to other inputs (e.g., Eccleston, Crombez, Aldrich, & Stannard, 1997; Zeltzer, Bursch, 
et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997).  For chronic pain patients, a bias to select pain for 
attention may contribute to symptom maintenance and related emotional distress and 
disability by prioritizing information related to pain over other information (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001; Crombez, Hermans, & Adriaensen, 2000).     
 
Influences of Threat Perception and Attentional  
Processes on the Experience of Pain 
 
Pain Beliefs and Appraisals 
Theoretical literature on pain beliefs and appraisal suggests that the degree to which 
pain is perceived as threatening influences attentional processing (e.g., Eccleston & 
Crombez, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  According to the stress and coping theory of 
Lazarus and colleagues (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Smith, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1990), 
prior-held beliefs about pain and context-specific appraisals of a given pain sensation shape 
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an individual’s perception of the implications of pain for an individual, or perceptions of pain 
threat.  Beliefs are “preexisting notions about reality which serve as a perceptual lens, or a 
‘set’” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 63).  Threatening beliefs about pain, such as the belief 
that pain is a signal of impending harm or sustained damage, may make important 
contributions to the pain appraisal process. 
Appraisals are evaluations made in a specific context that determine whether or not 
an event will be stressful, such as appraisal of a particular pain episode as harmful or benign.  
Two forms of appraisal, primary and secondary, are important in this evaluation.  Primary 
appraisals of pain evaluate its significance for one’s well-being, including evaluations of the 
intensity and frequency of pain symptoms, as well as the severity of an individual’s pain 
condition (e.g., prognosis and expected duration).  As pain is typically undesirable for 
children, primary appraisals of pain essentially include evaluations of whether or not harm 
has been sustained or is anticipated.  Secondary appraisals are assessments of one’s potential 
for coping with a pain episode, including perceived efficacy for problem-focused and 
emotion-focused coping responses.  For a child with RAP, secondary appraisals of pain 
include assessments of whether or not the child can do something to end or alleviate the pain 
episode, and/or effectively regulate the negative emotions associated with it and continue 
with regular activities.  Although primary and secondary appraisals describe evaluations of 
different concepts, Lazarus and Folkman note that they are interdependent, and probably 
influence each other.  Although not specifically addressed by Lazarus and colleagues, their 
theory and new research (Walker, Smith, Garber, & Claar, 2005) suggests that if children are 
confronted repeatedly with abdominal pain, appraisals of the pain are likely to be similar 
over time, giving rise to an appraisal style or characteristic way of evaluating the threat of 
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pain for the individual, contributing to beliefs about pain.   
Studies of patients with chronic pain indicate that pain beliefs and appraisals have 
important associations with the experience of pain.  Several studies note that improvements 
made during adult pain treatment programs are associated with changes in pain beliefs (e.g., 
Jensen, Romano, Turner, Good, & Wald, 1999; Jensen, Turner, & Romano, 2001; Turner, 
Jensen, & Romano, 2000).  For example, one study found that decreases in the belief that 
pain signals damage was associated with decreases in patient disability, and decreases in the 
belief that one is disabled was associated with decreases in pain intensity, disability, and 
depression (Jensen, et al., 2001).  In addition, a recent examination of coping with RAP 
found that prior-held pain beliefs and episode-specific secondary appraisals were important 
in predicting pain coping strategies, which, in turn, were related to reports of somatic 
symptoms and emotional distress (Walker et al., 2005).  These findings provide support for 
the role of threat perception in the experience of pain and related distress and disability. 
The perception of pain threat may result in emotional states that facilitate attentional 
orienting to and engagement with pain, and hinder attentional shift from pain.  According to 
Lazarus and Folkman, “fear is the manifestation of a specific stressful appraisal” (1984, p. 
70).  Individuals who perceive pain as threatening may report elevated fears regarding pain 
and other aspects of physical health.  Common fears reported by adult pain patients with 
chronic pain are manifest in specific concerns regarding undiagnosed problems causing pain, 
avoidance of pain exacerbation, and avoidance of situations in which pain episodes would be 
particularly unpleasant (e.g., Kori, Miller, & Todd, 1990; Waddell, Newton, Henderson, 
Somerville, & Main, 1993).  Chronic pain conditions, in which attempts at pain control fail 
and escape from pain is impossible, provide ample opportunities for pain-related fear and 
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worry to thrive (Aldrich et al., 2000; Eccleston & Crombez, 1999). Researchers have 
suggested that the perception of pain threat and experience of related emotional distress may 
result in a vigilant attentional style that prioritizes pain over other concerns and facilitates 
attentional interference of pain (Aldrich et al., 2000).  Furthermore, pain-related fear may 
result in increased use of pain coping strategies that attempt to avoid pain (Asmundson, 
Norton, & Norton, 1997).  Thus, the perception of pain threat and experience of related 
emotional distress may have important associations with attentional orienting toward or away 
from pain. 
Studies of patients with chronic pain conditions suggest a relation between pain fear 
and attentional bias for pain, and highlight the role of pain-related fear in the experience of 
disability related to pain (Crombez, Eccleston, Baeyens, Van Houdenhove, & Van den 
Broeck, 1999; Crombez, Vlaeyen, Heuts, & Lysens, 1999).  One study found pain-related 
fear to be superior to pain characteristics (e.g., pain intensity, duration) in predicting 
disability in adult patients with chronic low back pain (Crombez, Vlaeyen, et al., 1999).  In 
addition, a separate study found that the combination of high pain intensity and high pain-
related fear was the best predictor of attentional interference on an attentionally-demanding 
task for adult patients with various chronic pain conditions (Crombez, Eccleston, et al., 
1999).  The authors of this study suggested that pain-related fear facilitates and intensifies the 
attentional interruption by pain.  
In summary, theory suggests that perceptions of pain threat have implications for the 
critical role of attentional processes in the experience of pain.  Preliminary evidence supports 
the role of pain beliefs and appraisal of threat in the experience of pain and related distress 
and disability.  Additional evidence suggests a link between the experience of pain fear, 
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which may be a manifestation of high threat appraisal, and attentional interference by pain. 
 
A Model of Pain, Threat, and Attention 
Figure 1 presents a model of the roles of attention and threat perception in the 
experience of pain.  At the onset of a pain sensation, attentional processes orient the  
individual to pain in varying degrees.  For example, pain may consume the majority of 
attentional resources such that prior engagement with other events is completely disrupted, or 
it may be attended to vaguely or not at all.  Pain intensity is hypothesized to influence this 
process.  Evidence suggests that higher levels of pain intensity demand higher degrees of 
attentional orienting than lower levels of pain intensity (e.g., Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of the roles of threat perception and attentional processing in the experience 
of pain. 
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Following this initial orientation to or detection of pain, self-regulatory processes, such as 
sensory monitoring or distraction, facilitate attentional engagement with or shifting from 
pain.  These regulatory processes influence later pain symptoms and/or emotional distress 
and disability.  For example, studies have shown that sensory monitoring of pain facilitates a 
quicker return to regular activities than avoidance of pain sensations, theoretically through its 
attention to symptoms and resulting awareness of decreases in pain intensity (Cioffi & 
Holloway, 1993).  In addition to its indirect influence through regulatory strategies, 
attentional orienting to pain is hypothesized to directly influence pain outcomes.  For 
example, if attention frequently orients to pain sensations, pain frequency is likely to be 
reported as high.  However, if attention is infrequently interrupted from other tasks and 
directed toward pain sensations, pain frequency may be reported as low.  
Theoretical literature on pain beliefs and appraisal suggests that the degree to which 
pain is perceived as threatening influences attentional orienting to, engagement with, and 
shifting from pain (e.g., Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  For 
example, a strong belief that pain is a signal of unavoidable harm may facilitate attentional 
orienting to a pain sensation.  Following this orientation, appraisals of the pain sensation and 
one’s efficacy for coping with it are hypothesized to influence whether or not and to what 
degree an individual continues to attend to pain (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999).  For instance, 
if an individual appraises pain as signaling harm and oneself as incapable of coping with it, 
the individual may be more likely to attend to pain (e.g., by ruminating about pain) and less 
likely to shift attention away from pain.  Theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and preliminary 
evidence (Walker et al., 2005) suggest that these appraisals are influenced by pain beliefs;.  
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For instance, a strong belief that one can cope with pain regardless of its severity will 
influence perceptions of individual pain episodes such that they are appraised as having low 
threat value. 
Attentional and threat perception factors are hypothesized to contribute individually 
and in concert to pain outcomes including episode frequency and severity, condition 
duration, and related emotional distress and disability.  Although depicted linearly here, these 
processes occur in a reciprocal fashion, with components depicted as outcome variables 
influencing components described as causal agents, both within and across pain episodes.  
For example, it is likely that past successes or failures in dealing with pain influence beliefs 
of one’s vulnerability to pain, and the tendency to attend to future pain sensations.  These 
processes are presented here from a unidirectional vantage for the ease of discussion, and to 
highlight the role of attentional orienting in setting the stage for pain appraisals, responses, 
and outcomes.   
 
Attentional Processes and Pain 
If pain indeed demands attention and urges escape (Eccleston & Crombez, 1999), 
effortful coping strategies may be required to override the inclination to engage attention 
with pain in attempt to alleviate it, since attempts to alleviate pain may be futile in the case of 
chronic pain (Aldrich et al., 2000).  However, children may differ in their ability to engage in 
pain responses that require a high level of attentional focus (Compas & Boyer, 2001).  In 
particular, Zeltzer and colleagues (Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997) 
have suggested that children with RAP have difficulties shifting their attention away from 
pain.  In this case, initial orienting of attention to pain would be particularly troublesome for 
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children with RAP, as it would set off a cycle of continued attention to pain, and perhaps 
futile efforts to control pain (Aldrich et al., 2000).  Furthermore, if children with RAP are 
hypervigilant for pain sensations, as suggested by Zeltzer and colleagues (Zeltzer, Bursch, et 
al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997), this cycle may be more easily and more often engaged 
for these children than for children who do not experience frequent abdominal pain episodes.  
 
Attentional Bias   
Initial orientation to threat cues is potentially important for people with chronic pain 
because it sets the stage for future pain responses (e.g., Compas & Boyer, 2001).  
Furthermore, evidence suggests that direction of attention (toward or away from pain) has 
important implications for chronic pain outcomes, with avoidant responses relating to poorer 
outcomes than responses that focus attention on pain, or, at minimum, acknowledge the 
presence of pain (e.g., Suls & Fletcher, 1985; Thomsen, Compas, Colletti, Stanger, Boyer, & 
Konik, 2002). 
Researchers have begun to investigate whether patients with chronic pain can be 
differentiated from pain-free individuals by a bias to select pain over other stimuli for 
attention.  In laboratory tasks, selection of target stimuli for attention is demonstrated by 
facilitation of responses to target stimuli when compared with responses to control stimuli.  
Attentional bias toward target stimuli occurs when responses to target-cued trials are 
consistently facilitated.  In contrast, attentional bias away from target stimuli occurs when 
responses to target-cued trials are consistently slowed.  Studies have found attentional biases 
for disorder-specific stimuli in children and adults with various psychological disorders, 
including  anxiety (e.g., Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & 
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Brown, 1995) and post-traumatic stress disorder (Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Pine, Mogg, 
Bradley, Montgomery, Monk, McClure, et al., 2005) as well as in adults with depression 
(e.g., Williams, Duncan, & Nulty, 1986).  For example, attentional bias to social threat words 
was found in patients with social phobia, but not patients with depression or healthy 
volunteers (Öhman & Soares, 1994).  Because health issues are a dominant concern for 
children with RAP (Lipani, Van Slyke, & Walker, unpublished data), it appears reasonable to 
suggest that children with RAP may have an attentional bias to pain and health-related 
stimuli (Boyer, 2002) and that these biases may have similar implications for chronic pain 
patients.   
Adaptations of the Stroop task (see Williams, Matthews, & MacLeod, 1996, for a 
review) and the Probe Detection task (dot probe task; MacLeod, Matthews, & Tata, 1986) 
have been used in the study of attentional bias for negative stimuli, such as physical and 
social threat words and faces with angry or sad expressions.  Response time in both tasks 
serves as the measure of attentional bias.  The Stroop task requires participants to name the 
print color or background color of negative words representing a concern of interest and 
neutral words, ignoring word content.  Slowed color-naming of negative words relative to 
neutral words is taken to indicate that attention was drawn to the negative word’s content, 
interfering with color naming, indicating selective attentional processing of cues representing 
a relevant concern (Riemann & McNally, 1995).  However, some suggest that slowed color-
naming may reflect avoidance of threat cues (e.g., De Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). 
A common variation of the dot probe task briefly presents a negative and a neutral 
stimulus on a computer screen, such as a negative and neutral word (e.g., “hurt” and “door”) 
or a negative and neutral face (e.g., an angry face and an expressionless face).  Following 
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each presentation, participants must identify the location of a probe (usually a small dot) that 
replaces one of the stimuli.  Faster response time when the dot replaces negative stimuli and 
slower response time when the dot replaces neutral stimuli are taken to indicate attentional 
bias toward negative stimuli, which could reflect a prioritization of threat stimuli in 
information processing.  In contrast, slowed response time when the dot replaces negative 
stimuli and faster response time when the dot replaces neutral stimuli are taken to reflect 
attentional bias away from negative stimuli, which may reflect a tendency to avoid 
threatening stimuli.   
In addition to measuring response facilitation or interference, the dot probe task 
permits measurement of attentional orienting at different points in time following the 
presentation of stimuli by varying the duration of time that stimuli remain on the screen 
before the probe appears.  In studies of adult attentional processing, supraliminal 
presentations typically present stimuli for 500 milliseconds, which is long enough to allow 
conscious processing of stimuli (e.g., Mogg et al., 1992).  Conversely, subliminal 
presentations appear so briefly that conscious awareness is reduced and participants do not 
report having viewed them.  However, semantic processing of subliminal presentations 
remains sufficiently intact to demonstrate anxiety-related attentional biases in patients with 
high levels of anxiety (e.g., MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & 
Matthews, 1993).  Subliminally presented words appear for as briefly as 14 milliseconds, 
followed by a mask of random letters or characters.  At such brief presentation rates, patients 
with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) exhibit a bias for negative information in general, 
whereas supraliminal presentations elicit a bias specifically to words related to their 
predominant concerns (e.g., Mogg, Bradley & Williams, 1995; Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & 
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White, 1995).  Although both subliminal and supraliminal presentations permit the 
measurement of early responses to stimuli, responses to subliminal presentations are thought 
to provide a measure of automatic and pre-attentive orienting, and responses to supraliminal 
presentations provide more time for attentional shift during controlled stages of processing 
(see Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999; Williams et al., 1997, for reviews).  
Although the Stroop and dot probe tasks essentially assess allocation of attention to 
competing stimuli, they do not assess the same aspects of attentional processing.  Whereas 
the Stroop task requires the suppression of a response (to read the word), this is not true for 
the dot probe task, which assesses allocation of visual attention (Mogg et al.,1992; Brosschot, 
de Ruiter, & Kindt, 1999).  An additional advantage of the dot probe task is that response 
times differentiate attentional shifts toward or away from threat, thus providing a measure of 
vigilance or avoidance (Brosschot et al., 1999).  It is not clear whether interference on the 
Stroop task reflects attention to or avoidance of the word’s content (e.g., De Ruiter & 
Brosschot, 1994). 
Studies have used the Stroop and dot probe tasks to investigate attentional bias to 
supraliminally-presented pain words in adults with chronic pain.  Several studies found 
interference effects for pain words when compared to neutral words on the Stroop task 
(Beck, Freeman, Shipherd, Hambley & Lackner, 2001; Crombez, Hermans, Adriaensen, 
2000; Pincus, Fraser, & Pearce, 1998; Pearce & Morley, 1989) and that this pattern of 
responding was specific to pain patients versus healthy participants (Pearce & Morley, 1989).  
Slowed color-naming latencies were not found for negatively valenced, non-pain words 
(Beck et al., 2001; Crombez et al., 2000; Pearce & Morley, 1989) or words related to other 
disorders (Crombez et al., 2000), suggesting that attentional bias in chronic pain patients is 
 21 
specific to pain-relevant information.  In addition, Crombez and colleagues found that this 
effect was specific to pain-sensory words (e.g., burning), but not pain-affect words (e.g., 
punishing), and that patients’ level of pain intensity predicted this effect, with higher levels 
of pain intensity related to slower color-naming of pain words.  Thus, there is some evidence 
to support the presence of attentional bias to pain words in adult patients with chronic pain. 
However, several investigations did not replicate these findings (Asmundson, 
Carleton & Ekong, 2005; Asmundson, Kuperos, & Norton, 1997; Duckworth, Iezzi, Adams, 
& Hale, 1997; Snider, Asmundson, & Wiese, 2000).  No difference was found between 
chronic pain patients’ and healthy controls’ responses to pain words on a Stroop task 
(Duckworth et al., 1997) or a dot probe task (Asmundson et al., 2005).  Other studies of 
chronic pain patients found that depression and anxiety played important roles in attentional 
bias for pain words.  Snider and colleagues reported that patients’ color-naming response 
latencies differed for pain words relative to neutral words on a Stroop task only when 
responses were controlled for depression scores.  Conversely, Pincus and colleagues (Pincus 
et al., 1998) found a trend for adult patients to show attentional bias toward pain words in a 
dot probe task, but when response times were controlled for depressive symptoms, no 
differences in response times were found between pain patients and healthy participants.  
Similarly, Asmundson and colleagues (1997) did not find differences in responses to pain 
words on a dot probe task between pain patients and healthy participants before or after 
controlling responses for depressive symptoms.  However, dividing patients into groups 
based on their level of anxiety sensitivity (i.e., fear of anxiety-related sensations) revealed 
significant differences in responses to pain words.  Patients with low anxiety sensitivity 
shifted their attention away from pain words, whereas patients with high anxiety sensitivity 
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did not demonstrate attentional bias toward pain words.  
In their review of attentional bias and pain studies, Pincus and Morley (2001) 
suggested that differences in findings across studies may be due to a number of factors 
including small sample sizes, methodological differences between studies, and samples of 
pain patients that are heterogeneous with respect to pain condition and related emotional 
distress.  They also suggested that the absence of consistent effects for pain patients 
performing the Stroop and dot probe tasks may be explained by additional attentional effort 
and strategy required of the tasks during experiences of pain.  In line with this hypothesis, 
attentional bias studies of patients with specific fears or phobias have found reduced 
interference by information related to the phobia when patients are tested in the presence of 
the object of phobia (e.g., people afraid of snakes tested in the presence of a snake, Öhman & 
Soares, 1994).  It has been hypothesized that the absence of interference under these 
conditions results from an increase in the effort required to perform the task (Williams et al., 
1996).   
Another possible explanation suggested for this lack of consistent findings is that 
chronic pain patients have acquired skills in managing their attentional resources during the 
experience of pain, and thus are able to override any bias to external pain information while 
experiencing pain and performing an attentionally-demanding task (Pincus and Morley, 
2001).  Researchers studying attentional bias to anxiety cues have used subliminal 
presentation rates to examine the possible functioning of attentional biases to pain before 
strategic skill overrides them (e.g., Mogg et al., 1993).  However, the only study 
investigating preconscious attentional bias in adults with chronic pain to date did not find a 
bias to or from pain words presented subliminally (Snider et al., 2000).  Thus, no clear 
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evidence exists to support the hypothesis that adults with chronic pain are overriding 
attentional bias during cognitive tasks that engage high levels of attentional effort. 
The only study investigating attentional bias in children with RAP investigated their 
bias to pain words both supraliminally and subliminally (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  
An additional category of words related to social concerns was included to test the specificity 
of bias for pain words versus another form of threat.  Results indicated that patients with 
RAP showed attentional bias to both categories of threat words when words were presented 
subliminally, and avoided both categories of threat when words were presented 
supraliminally.  This pattern of responding suggests that the attention of patients with RAP 
was at first drawn to threat words, and, following this initial orientation, patients shifted their 
attention away from threat, reflecting attentional avoidance; this was related to parents’ 
reports of more pain and somatic symptoms.  Furthermore, when patients’ levels of negative 
affect were statistically controlled, results showed that negative affect accounted for the 
significant differences in bias scores.  Boyer (2002) suggested that attentional biases to 
threatening cues are at least partly a function of concurrent negative affect for children with 
RAP (see also Luecken, Tartaro & Appelhans, 2004).   
Vasey and colleagues (Vasey, El-Hag, & Daleiden, 1995; Vasey & Daleiden, 1996) 
note that attentional bias toward threat stimuli serves the ultimate goal of avoiding 
threatening events.  For children with frequent abdominal pain, vigilance for pain is rewarded 
with early detection, which enables subsequent avoidance of pain and related emotional 
distress with minimum effort (e.g., avoiding the experience of abdominal pain by suppressing 
thoughts and ignoring signs of pain).  In this way, an attentional bias toward threatening 
stimuli may function as an anxiety regulatory mechanism by fostering the early avoidance of 
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distress-promoting experiences.  These processes may have been reflected in the subliminal 
attention toward pain and supraliminal avoidance of pain demonstrated by patients in Boyer’s 
study.  Despite the short-term benefits of this potential sequence, it is possible that bias 
toward threat will interfere with effective information-processing and coping responses 
(Compas & Boyer, 2001; Vasey & Daleiden, 1996) and perhaps lead to increases in pain 
intensity or experiences (Cioffi, 1991; Cioffi & Holloway, 1993).  Nonetheless, because 
pain-free children were not included in Boyer’s study of attentional biases to threatening 
stimuli in children with RAP, it is not known whether these biases and their relation to 
current affect exists for all children, or whether they are uniquely related to the experience of 
chronic pain. 
Preliminary evidence from studies comparing children with low and high levels of 
anxiety symptoms or fears suggest that children with low levels of anxiety do not 
demonstrate an attentional bias to threat words (Martin, Horder, & Jones, 1992; Dalgleish, 
Taghavi, Neshat-doost, Moradi, Canterbury, & Yule, 2003; Vasey et al., 1995; 1996).  
However, these studies have been limited by small sample sizes, limited age ranges, and use 
of stimuli that were not rated by children for their threat value.  Furthermore, children were 
not screened with respect to their somatic health.  Thus, it cannot be determined from the 
current empirical literature on children with somatic or affective disorders whether 
attentional bias for physical threat words is unique to the experience of recurrent pain in 
children.  
The degree of perceived threat has been investigated in relation to attentional bias for 
threatening stimuli.  Using facial stimuli in a dot probe task, one study found that threat 
intensity of facial stimuli was related to patterns of attentional bias (Wilson & MacLeod, 
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2003).  Responses to faces with expressions ranging in intensity from very low to very high 
anger were presented to individuals with high or low levels of anxiety.  Regardless of their 
anxiety level, all participants directed attention away from mildly threatening faces and 
toward strongly threatening faces.  However, the intensity of stimulus threat required to elicit 
attention to stimuli was dependent upon participants’ anxiety level.  Specifically, participants 
who had low levels of anxiety continued to avoid facial stimuli of moderate anger levels, 
while participants with high levels of anxiety oriented toward these same faces.  From these 
results, it appears that individuals’ perceptions of the level of threat associated with stimuli 
are important for eliciting attentional bias.  For patients with chronic pain, attentional bias to 
pain may depend upon the perceived intensity of pain threat.  Differences between chronic 
pain patients in threshold for appraising pain as threatening may account for differences in 
attentional bias scores.  
The failure of previous studies to consistently document attentional biases in chronic 
pain patients might be due to differences in the threat value of pain stimuli for participants.  
Thus far, general anxiety has been an inconsistent predictor of attentional bias scores in 
patients with chronic pain.  However, anxiety that is specific to physical health show more 
promise in detecting participants who are threatened by pain stimuli and subsequently 
demonstrate attentional bias for pain (Crombez, Eccleston, et al., 1999; Van Damme, 
Crombez, Eccleston, & Goubert, 2004).  A study of pain-free individuals performing a dot 
probe task found that levels of pain fear determined participants’ bias for pain words (Keogh, 
Ellery, Hun, & Hannent, 2001).  Participants who reported high levels of pain fear attended 
toward pain words, whereas participants with low to moderate levels of pain fear showed no 
such bias.  Although participants in these studies did not experience chronic pain, these 
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results support the hypothesis set forth by Crombez and colleagues that pain-related fear 
promotes attentional interference by pain (Crombez et al., 1999). 
To summarize, attentional bias to pain is likely to increase attentional disruption by 
pain, and possibly cause additional difficulties in subsequent regulation of attention to pain.  
Findings from experimental investigations of attentional bias for pain stimuli using the 
Stroop and dot probe tasks in adults with chronic pain and children with RAP have been 
inconsistent, perhaps owing to the many variations of stimuli and tasks used, as well as 
differences between participants (Pincus & Morley, 2001).  Theoretical literature and recent 
studies of pain beliefs and threat appraisal suggest that perception of pain threat may be 
important in predicting the degree to which patients demonstrate attentional bias to pain.   
 
The Current Study 
 
Overview 
Theoretical and empirical literature suggests that attentional processes play a role in 
the experience of chronic pain conditions such as RAP, the most common chronic pain 
condition in children.    Specifically, it has been suggested that children with RAP 
demonstrate excessive vigilance for pain sensations, increasing the chances that pain will be 
detected (Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997).  They also may 
demonstrate an attentional bias to pain, increasing the possibility that their attention will be 
interrupted by pain sensations (e.g., Compas & Boyer, 2001; Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 
2006).  Using a dot probe task with carefully researched words regarding their 
appropriateness for children as young as 8 years, this study will be a first attempt to 
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investigate whether patients with RAP differ from healthy children in attentional processing 
of physical threat cues presented at subliminal and supraliminal presentation rates.  
Furthermore, the content specificity of abdominal pain patients’ attentional orienting to 
physical threat cues will be examined by comparing participants’ attentional orienting to 
physical threat to their attentional orienting for a second category of threat cues, namely, 
social threat.  Physical and social threat cues will be presented at subliminal and supraliminal 
speeds to examine initial and subsequent attentional orienting to threatening information.  
A third focus of this study will be to investigate the relations between attentional 
orienting to threat stimuli and pain threat perception, anxiety symptoms, and current negative 
affect.  Theory and preliminary evidence suggest that elevated levels of threat perception and 
anxiety symptoms contribute to biases to select threatening information for attention by 
creating a vigilant attentional style that prioritizes threat and facilitates attentional 
interference (e.g., Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999).  Therefore, 
patients with RAP who have more negative pain beliefs or perceptions of pain may have 
stronger attentional biases for pain and physical threat stimuli.  Furthermore, as documented 
in previous research, children with higher levels of negative affect and/or higher levels of 
anxiety symptoms may demonstrate stronger patterns of attentional bias for physical and 
social threat stimuli.  Thus, this study will investigate the relation of attentional bias for 
threat with these variables for pain-free children and children with RAP.  Because of the 
generally low concordance between child-report and parent- or teacher-report of anxiety 
symptoms in children (e.g., see reviews by Greco & Morris, 2004 and Schniering, Hudson & 
Rapee, 2000), this study will attempt to improve upon previous research on the relation of 
anxiety to attentional bias by using children’s self-reports of anxiety symptoms.   
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Finally, pediatric research findings regarding gender differences in attentional bias to 
threat words have been inconsistent.  Preliminary findings suggest that gender differences 
may exist for relatively healthy children (e.g., Vasey et al., 1996) but not for children with 
RAP (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  Additionally, little information is available regarding 
the relation of age to attentional bias for threat in patients with RAP.  Therefore, exploratory 
analyses will examine the role of sex and age in attentional bias to threat words for children 
with RAP and pain-free children. 
 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis #1: Nature of attentional bias patterns within groups.  The primary aim of 
this study is to investigate the content-specificity of attentional bias in children with RAP.  It 
is expected that attentional bias patterns for this group will largely replicate previous findings 
(Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006) such that children with RAP demonstrate attentional bias to 
both physical and social threat words presented at a subliminal presentation rate.  At the 
supraliminal level, children with RAP are expected to show more avoidance of (attention 
away from) physical threat words than social threat words.  Differences between attentional 
bias scores for physical and social threat words are expected to be small for this group 
relative to the attentional bias scores for children with RAP.   
Hypothesis #2: Group differences in patterns of attentional bias.  The secondary aim 
of this study is to test whether attentional bias patterns for physical threat words differ 
between children with RAP and pain-free children.  Specifically, children with RAP are 
expected to demonstrate stronger attentional bias toward subliminally presented physical and 
social threat words than Well children.  Furthermore, children with RAP are expected to 
 29 
demonstrate stronger attentional avoidance of supraliminally presented physical threat words.   
Hypothesis #3: Psychological correlates of attentional bias.  First, the relation of 
state negative affect with attentional bias scores is expected to replicate the findings of Boyer 
(2002) for both children with RAP and pain-free children.  Specifically, it is expected that 
stronger negative affect before the dot probe task will be associated with stronger attentional 
bias scores.  Higher negative affect scores are expected to be related to greater bias for 
subliminally presented physical and social threat words, reflecting stronger bias toward 
threat.  In addition, higher negative affect scores are expected to be associated with greater 
avoidance of supraliminally presented physical and social threat words.   
Second, it is expected that anxiety symptoms will be related to attentional bias for 
children with RAP, as well as pain-free children.  Using self-reports of anxiety symptoms, 
higher levels of anxiety symptoms are expected to be related to stronger attentional bias 
toward subliminally presented physical and social threat words, and stronger avoidance 
supraliminally presented physical and social threat words.   
Finally, for children with RAP, attentional bias patterns for physical threat words are 
hypothesized to be related to perceptions of pain threat.  Specifically, using self-reports of 
pain beliefs, it is expected that more threatening beliefs about pain will be related to greater 
attentional bias to subliminally presented physical threat words, and greater attentional 
avoidance of supraliminally presented physical threat words.   
Exploratory Analyses: Examination of age and gender effects on attentional bias.  
Exploratory analyses will examine the role of sex and age in attentional bias to threat words 
for children with RAP and pain-free children.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
 Children were eligible for the study if they were between the ages of 8 and 16 
years inclusive, had not had major surgery in the last year, and had no identified reading 
disability or chronic health condition (other than chronic abdominal pain for children with 
RAP).  Information regarding children’s somatic and affective distress was provided for 
96% of participants by a caregiver.  Participating caregivers included mothers (79%), 
fathers (15%) and non-parent caregivers (e.g., grandparents; 2%).   
Children with RAP (the “RAP group”) were 77 patients newly referred to the 
Vanderbilt Pediatric Gastroenterology Clinic, or were recruited from a previous study of 
children with RAP that recruited participants from this clinic.  In an effort to restrict the 
sample to only one form of chronic pain condition (Pincus & Morley, 2001) only children 
experiencing functional abdominal pain meeting criteria for Apley’s (1975) description of 
RAP were invited to participate.1  Thus, in the three months preceding the lab study, 
patients in the RAP group experienced at least three episodes of abdominal pain that 
interfered with their activities (Apley, 1975), and for which no medical evaluation to date 
had identified an organic cause.  Based on caregiver reported obtained at the time of their 
initial clinic visit, 17% of these patients experienced abdominal pain on a daily basis, 
                                                
1 Because frequent headaches are common in children with chronic abdominal pain (e.g., Hyams, Burke, 
Davis, Rzepski, &  Andrulonis, 1996), children with RAP who also experienced chronic headaches were 
not excluded.  
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51% experienced abdominal pain several times per week, and 26% experienced 
abdominal pain once per week or less frequently; 62% of patients had experienced 
recurrent episodes of abdominal pain for more than a year.   The average amount of time 
between initial clinic appointment and study participation date was four months (mean = 
120.90 days, SD = 135.60 days).  The time between clinic appointment and lab visit was 
within one month for 27.8% of patients, between one and six months for 48.5% of 
patients, between six months to one year for 13.9% of patients, and more than one year 
for 9.1% of patients.   
The RAP group included 48 female and 29 male patients whose mean age was 
11.79 years (SD = 2.18, range = 8 – 16 years).  The majority of the patients were 
Caucasian (87.0%) and the remainder were African-American (5.2%), Asian-American 
(2.6%) or from other ethnic backgrounds (5.2%).  In addition, 10.4% of children with 
RAP reported that they predominantly use their left hands for writing.  The mean 
occupational status of their parents, based on the Hollingshead occupational scores that 
range from one to nine (Hollingshead, 1975), was 5.19 (SD = 1.17) or that of clerical 
workers, salespeople and small farm owners.     
Pain-free children (“Well children”) were recruited from a larger survey study 
conducted in public schools that took place, on average, approximately one year before 
the lab visit.  The time between the survey study and lab visit was between two and six 
months for 40.8% of Well children, between six months and one year for 21.0% of Well 
children, and more than one year for 38.1% of Well children.  At the time of the lab visit, 
Well children were excluded from the study if they had experienced moderate to severe 
pain (e.g., abdominal pain, headaches, and menstrual pain) once or more per month in the 
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preceding three months, or mild pain more than once per month during the preceding 
three months.  In addition, efforts were made to ensure that healthy participants were not 
scheduled to participate following a recent illness episode or injury (e.g., flu) in the two 
weeks prior to their study session.  The Well group included 81 participants (35 female, 
46 male) whose mean age was 11.78 years (SD = 2.32, range = 8 – 16 years).  The 
majority of the patients were Caucasian (97.5%) and the remainder were African-
American (2.5%).  In addition, 9.9% of Well children reported that they predominantly 
use their left hands for writing.  The mean occupational status of their parents, based on 
the 9-point Hollingshead occupational scores (Hollingshead, 1975), was 4.84 (SD = 1.04) 
which falls between the category that includes skilled manual workers, craftsmen, and 
law enforcement workers and the category that includes clerical workers, salespeople and 
small farm owners.   
 
Measures 
 
Attentional bias 
Children’s attentional biases to physical and social-threat related information were 
measured using a modified probe detection task (“dot probe task”) introduced as the Dot 
Game.  As discussed above, variations of the dot probe task have been used in research with 
adults and children.  The current task uses threat words describing physical threat (e.g., pain, 
disease) and social threat (e.g., loser, lonely).  Procedures for selecting words followed the 
protocols of Vasey and colleagues (Vasey, et al., 1995; 1996) and Boyer and colleagues 
(Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006) with several important modifications that are detailed 
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below. 
Word Selection Procedure.  Words for the dot probe task were initially gathered 
from other dot probe studies (e.g., Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006; Vasey, et al., 1995; 
1996).  However, some of these words were at sixth-grade reading levels, and would 
require more advanced reading skills than the skills of many younger children in this 
study.  Furthermore, previous studies using the dot probe task with children have selected 
negatively valenced and neutral words based upon adult emotional valence ratings.  To 
create a list of words appropriate for this age group with respect to these issues, a 
research team of faculty members and graduate students collaborating on a larger study 
of attentional bias to threat in children generated additional words.  All words were rated 
by children for their emotional valence, by teachers for their reading level, and by other 
graduate students for their relevance to the proposed categories of physical threat, social 
threat, and neutral words.  The procedures and selection criteria for each form of rating 
are described below. 
To obtain the threat value of words perceived by youngsters the same age as 
children completing the dot probe task, 454 students ages 8 to 15 in public schools were 
asked to rate the emotional valence of words.  An initial pool of over 450 words was 
divided into 15 rating forms of 32 words each, with some duplication of words across 
forms2.  Words predicted to have a positive emotional valence were included so that 
students would use a variety of rating points.  Each word was rated with one of the 
                                                
2 To determine whether younger and older students rated words similarly, 48 words were rated by children 
ages 8-10 years and children ages 11-15 years.  Comparison of these ratings found differences between age 
groups to be insignificant. 
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following descriptors: “very bad,”  “bad,” “a little bad,” “not good and not bad,” “a little 
good,” “good,” and “very good3.”  Descriptors were assigned numerical values of -3 to 3, 
respectively, and mean scores were computed for each.  An average of 29 students 
completed each rating form, ensuring that a minimum of 24 students rated each word.   
Initial inspection of the data revealed that forms from 23 participants were invalid 
due to pattern responding.  After removing invalid ratings, the minimum number of 
students rating each word was 22.  Average valence ratings were computed for each 
word.  A word was considered “neutral” if the average rating of that word was between –
1 and 1 (i.e., average rating between “a little bad” and “a little good”).  A word was 
considered “threatening” if its average rating was between –1.5 and -3 (i.e., between “a 
little bad” and “very bad”).      
To confirm that words were reflective of the threat categories for which they were 
intended, twenty graduate students naïve to the purpose of the study were asked to 
categorize the words.  Graduate students categorized an average of 85 words so that each 
word was rated by five students.  Words appeared individually on Power Point slides, and 
were categorized as “positive”, “social threat”, “physical threat” or “does not fit any of 
these categories” on a numbered answer sheet.    Threat words were included in the dot 
probe task only if a minimum of four students agreed upon their category (80% 
agreement).  Similarly, neutral words were included only if a minimum of four students 
did not categorize them into the positive or one of the threat categories. 
                                                
3 Words rated on the first three forms were rated on a 5-point scale with ratings of “really good,” “a little 
good,” “not good and not bad,” “a little bad,” and “really bad.”  Ratings from these forms were recoded to 
the seven-point scale such that “really good” and “really bad” were recoded as “very good” and “very bad,” 
respectively, whereas the ratings “a little good,” “not good and not bad,” and “a little bad” were not 
recoded. 
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To ensure that words in the dot probe task could be read and understood by 
children as young as eight years, a third grade and a fourth grade teacher were asked to 
rate whether words were readable and comprehensible by children finishing third grade.  
Only words that were judged readable and comprehensible to this age group by both 
teachers were considered appropriate for the study.   
The final list of 20 physical threat words, 20 social threat words, and 80 neutral 
words met the above criteria for emotional valence, category relevance, and readability.  
Each threat word was paired with a neutral word according to its number of letters.  
These pairs were inspected by the team of researchers and revisions were made so that no 
pair contained words with clear relations to each other (e.g., the original pairings of 
“glass” with “bleed” was revised because of the potential for glass to cause bleeding).  
Table 1 lists the 20 physical and 20 social threat words with their matched neutral words.  
In addition to these 40 threat-neutral word pairs, 20 length-matched neutral-neutral word 
pairs were included to control for response biases that might result from the expectation 
of negative words on each trial.  In total, 60 distinct pairs of words were included in the 
dot probe task. 
To inspect whether the physical and social threat words were similarly negative, 
and significantly more negative than neutral words, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
compared their emotional valence ratings.  Results indicated that the valence scores for 
threat and neutral word categories were significantly different from each other, F (2, 77) 
= 545.35, p < .001.  A Scheffe’s test indicated that the mean valence ratings for physical 
threat words (M = -2.04, SD = 0.36) and social threat words (M = -2.04, SD = 0.27) were 
not significantly different from each other, but that they were significantly different from 
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the neutral word valence ratings (M = 0.30, SD = 0.32).  The internal consistency of both 
groups of threat-neutral word pairs was examined for subliminal and supraliminal 
presentation intervals (see below).  The alpha reliability coefficient was .97 for physical 
threat words presented subliminally and supraliminally, and .96 for social threat words 
presented subliminally and supraliminally.  In addition, an ANOVA comparing the length 
of physical (M = 5.40 letters, SD = 1.98) and social threat words (M = 5.25, SD = 1.33) 
did not reveal significant differences, F (2, 77) = 0.35, ns.   
 
Table 1. 
Threat Words and their Matched Neutral Words. 
     Physical Threat List           Social Threat List 
            
flu lid   ugly  what 
ill cup   jerk  twig 
stab iron   dumb  pans 
sick lamp  hate  roof 
pain coat   snob  bark 
hurt then   dork  pile 
burn when  loser  floor 
ache clap   bully  round 
germs hills   enemy  fence 
cramp broom  idiot  stove 
bleed about  coward magnet 
injure button  stupid  washer 
disease streets  teased  across 
painful address  lonely  faucet 
throwup balloon  insult  stairs 
headache backpack  disliked mountain 
accident umbrella  crybaby dresser 
emergency paperclip  unloved evening  
bellyache newspaper  lonesome railroad 
stomachache streetlight  unpopular furniture 
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Dot Probe Experiment.  Procedures for the dot probe task follow procedures of recent 
studies as closely as possible (e.g., Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  Word pairs were 
presented on a 15-inch monitor of a Dell computer.  The experiment was controlled and 
timed with E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 2001).  The order of presentation 
for the 60 word pairs was randomly generated by the computer for each participant.  Each 
threat-neutral word pair was presented at a subliminal presentation rate and a supraliminal 
presentation rate.  To control for order effects and prevent consecutive presentations of the 
same word pair at different presentation rates, their order was counter-balanced across the 
first and second halves of the experiment.  Specifically, a pair that was presented 
subliminally during the first half of the experiment was presented supraliminally during the 
second half of the experiment, and a pair that was presented supraliminally during the first 
half was presented subliminally during the second half of the experiment.  In total, each 
participant completed 120 distinct trials of the experiment.  When participants completed the 
first half of the experiment, they were given a one-minute break during which they could rest 
their eyes. 
During each trial of the experiment, a white addition symbol (“+”) appeared as a 
fixation mark in the center of the screen for 1 second.  Following the fixation mark, one of 
the 60 word pairs appeared on the screen either subliminally or supraliminally.  All 
characters appeared in white Courier font on a black background, one above the other in the 
center of the screen, separated by 3 centimeters.  The position of the threat word in the upper 
or lower position was balanced across physical threat-neutral and social threat-neutral word 
pairs.  Following the word pairs, the dot probe, a period (“.”), appeared in the same position 
as one of the words in the word pair, replacing upper and lower words with equal frequency 
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across trials.  Participants were instructed to press a corresponding key as quickly and 
accurately as possible to indicate the position of the dot.  Participants were instructed to press 
the “c” key when the dot appeared in the upper position and the “m” key when the dot 
appeared in the lower position.  The keys were labeled “UP” and “DOWN,” respectively.  In 
addition, two small pictures of arrows were placed on the bottom border of the computer 
monitor in line with the “c” and “m” keys.  The left arrow pointed upward as a reminder that 
the “c” key indicated the upper position, and the right arrow pointed downward as a reminder 
that the “m” key indicated the lower position.   These instructions, labels, and arrow 
illustrations were reversed for half of participants to control for hand dominance. 
Subliminal and supraliminal presentation rates were timed according to the existing 
study of attentional bias in patients with RAP (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  Word pairs 
in the supraliminal trials appeared on the screen for 1250 ms, and pairs in the subliminal 
trials appeared for 20 ms.  In order to prevent subliminally presented words from leaving a 
faded image after disappearing, identical strings of consonant letters (e.g., FWRTP and 
FWRTP) replaced the upper and lower subliminally presented words.  The letter strings were 
composed of an equal number of letters as the words that they replaced.  To match the total 
presentation time of supraliminal word pairs, letter strings appeared for 1230 ms after 
subliminal word pairs. 
The computer recorded the rate and accuracy of participants’ responses for each trial.  
Recorded latencies to threat-neutral word pair trials serve as the measure of selective 
attention. For each participant, attentional bias toward threat words is indicated by shorter 
response latencies on trials in which dot probes replaced threat words, and longer response 
latencies on trials in which dot probes replaced neutral words.  An attentional bias away from 
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threat words, or an avoidance of threat words, is indicated by the opposite of these patterns.  
Specifically, longer response latencies for trials in which dot probes replaced threat words 
and shorter response latencies for trials in which dot probes replaced neutral words will 
indicate an attentional bias away from threat words.  Patterns of selective attention for both 
supraliminal and subliminal trials are discussed below. 
Awareness check.  Following the Dot Probe task, an awareness check was 
administered to test whether participants could report reading subliminally presented word 
pairs.  With the exception of a response prompt, the procedures of this task are identical to 
those outlined by Boyer (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2001) was used to present the task, which was introduced to participants as 
the “Word Game.”  Similar to the subliminal presentations of word pairs in the Dot Probe 
task, an addition sign appeared on the computer screen for 1 second as a fixation point, 
followed by two words, one above the other, for 20 ms.  Half of the trials presented real 
words (e.g., house, driveway) and the remaining trials presented nonsense words (i.e., 
pronounceable words with no meaning; e.g., blorky, snidbell).  Length-matched, identical 
strings of consonant letters replaced the words for 1230 ms.  Following the letter strings, a 
question mark (“?”) prompted participants to indicate whether a real word or a nonsense 
word was presented.  A 50% overall accuracy rate would indicate that participants were 
guessing and/or unable to read the words and identify them as real or nonsense. 
Participants completed the awareness check in a similar manner to the dot probe task, 
except that no practice trials were administered, and participants were informed of the 
percentage of real and nonsense words.  Participants rested their left index finger on the “c” 
key and their right index finger on the “m” key.  The “c” key was labeled “YES” to indicate 
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that real words were presented, and the “m” key was labeled “NO” to indicate that real words 
were not presented.  In addition to the key labels, small cards labeled “YES” and “NO” 
replaced the up/down arrow cards on the monitor to remind participants which key indicated 
yes and no.  The keys’ meanings and labels were reversed for half of participants to control 
for hand dominance.  The computer recorded response latency and accuracy.  Three physical 
threat word pairs, three social threat word pairs, and nine filler word pairs were included in 
the task.  The computer presented 18 different trials in random order for each participant. 
 
Current Affect and Somatic Symptoms 
Following Boyer (2002), participants completed a brief mood rating scale prior to the 
dot probe task.  Items were derived from the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).  Children were asked to rate how much they feel each of 
three positive emotions (happy, interested, and confident) and three negative emotions (sad, 
angry, nervous).  According to Boyer (2002), these items were chosen for their relatedness to 
positive or negative affect, as well as their reading level.  Each word appeared in the center 
of the computer screen above a 5-point Likert-type rating scale.  In contrast to the self-ratings 
completed with paper and pencil in Boyer’s (2002) study, the experimenter read the stem for 
each item, “How much do you feel…” followed by the affect word, and entered participants’ 
responses directly into the computer using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 
2001).  Participants rated the extent to which each word applied to their current affect using 
response choices on the screen that ranged from “1 = not at all” to “5 = a whole lot.”  Ratings 
were recoded to a 0 to 4 scale.  Recoded ratings of positive and negative emotions were 
averaged to yield indices of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) before the dot 
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probe task, respectively. 
Following the dot probe task, participants completed the Symptom Emotion Report 
(SER; Walker, Williams, et al., 2006) in a similar manner to the mood rating scale.  The SER 
was developed to assess symptoms and emotions experienced by patients in association with 
abdominal pain episodes.  Symptoms on the checklist were derived from a longer measure of 
children’s physical symptoms, the Children’s Somatization Inventory (Walker & Greene, 
1989), an instrument designed to assess somatic symptoms in children with recurrent 
abdominal pain.  The SER was administered after the dot probe task to avoid priming 
participants for the symptom/physical threat items that appeared in the dot probe task (Lundh 
& Czyzykow-Czarnocka, 2001).  Modifications were made for this study to include 
additional items from the mood rating scale and to reduce the overall number of items.  
Because items are repeated from the mood rating scale completed before the dot probe task, 
the experimenter introduced the SER by asking participants to think carefully about how they 
are feeling “right now,” and throughout the administration emphasized that participants 
should assess how they are feeling at that very point in time.  Items appeared on the computer 
screen above the same five-point rating scale as the mood rating scale, which ranged from “1 
= not at all” to “5 = a whole lot” and is recoded to a 0 to 4 scale.   The experimenter read the 
stem for each item, “How much do you feel…” followed by each item as it appeared on the 
screen, and entered responses directly into the computer.   
In addition to six affect items included to assess post-dot probe PA and NA indices, 
participants were asked to rate how much they were experiencing three gastrointestinal (GI) 
symptoms (stomach ache, stomach upset, feel like throwing up) and thirteen Non-GI 
symptoms (e.g., dizzy, tired, headache, back ache).  Recoded ratings of GI and Non-GI 
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symptom items were averaged to create a GI Symptom Index and a Non-GI Symptom Index, 
respectively.  Scores on the both indices can range from 0 to 4.     
 
Reading Screener 
Two subtests of the Woodcock Johnson-III Tests of Achievement (Woodcock, 
McGrew, & Mather, 2001) were administered to assess participants’ reading ability.  In 
subtest 1, Letter-Word Identification, participants demonstrated reading skills by reading a 
list of words.  In subtest 17, Reading Vocabulary, participants demonstrated reading 
comprehension and knowledge of vocabulary by reading words and naming their synonyms 
or antonyms, and completing word analogies.  Administration and scoring procedures follow 
a standardized protocol in which the examiner administers one or two examples before 
asking participants to complete the task.  Correct responses for each subtest were summed 
and compared to norms based on a nationally representative standardization sample that 
yields grade equivalencies.  The two subtest scores were averaged to obtain an estimate of 
reading ability. 
 
Anxiety Symptoms 
Children age 10 and over were invited to complete the Multidimensional Anxiety 
Scale for Children (MASC; March, Parker, Sullivan, Stallings, & Conners, 1997) after the 
study session, either on their own or with the help of an experimenter by phone.  The MASC 
was completed after the dot probe task to avoid priming participants for the threat items that 
appeared in the dot probe task (cf. Lundh & Czyzykow-Czarnocka, 2001) and was typically 
completed on a different day to avoid participant fatigue.  Children rated how often each 
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statement is true for them on a 4-point rating scale ranging from “0 = Never true about me” 
to “3 = Often true about me.”  The MASC consists of 39 items distributed across four major 
factors: (1) Physical Symptoms Scale (e.g., “My heart races or skips beats” and “I feel tense 
or uptight”), (2) Harm Avoidance Scale (e.g., “I try to do everything exactly right,” and “I 
check to make sure things are safe”), (3) Social Anxiety Scale (e.g., “I worry about other 
people laughing at me,” and “I worry about getting called on in class”), and (4) Separation 
anxiety/Panic Scale (e.g., “I try to stay near my mom or dad,” and “I keep the light on at 
night”).  In addition, the MASC yields a Total Anxiety Scale, which sums responses to items 
across the four main scales, and an Anxiety Disorders Index, which sums responses to items 
that have been found to differentiate children with a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder from 
children without a diagnosis.  These six scales are based on factor analytic findings, and their 
sum scores can be converted to age and gender-based standard scores (T-scores).  The MASC 
has been shown to have excellent internal reliability (e.g., March et al., 1997) and adequate 
test-retest reliability (e.g., March et al., 1997; March, Sullivan, & Parker, 1999).   
 
Pain Threat Beliefs 
Children with RAP age 10 and over were invited to complete the Pain Beliefs 
Questionnaire (PBQ; Van Slyke, 2001; Walker, Smith, et al., 2005) after the study 
session, either on their own or with the help of an experimenter by phone.  Like the 
MASC, the PBQ was completed after the dot probe task to avoid priming participants for 
the threat items that appeared in the dot probe task (cf. Lundh & Czyzykow-Czarnocka, 
2001) and was typically completed on a different day to avoid participant fatigue.  The 
PBQ is grounded in the conceptual approach to appraisal and coping formulated by 
 44 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) and includes subscales assessing primary and secondary 
characteristic appraisals or beliefs regarding abdominal pain.  According to Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984), primary appraisal refers to perceived potential for or sustained harm.  
This is assessed by the PBQ with two subscales.  The Primary Appraisal – Pain Episode 
subscale consists of eight items assessing the duration and intensity of pain episodes (e.g., 
“My stomach aches hurt a whole lot”). The Primary Appraisal – Condition Severity 
subscale consists of twelve items assessing the expected duration of patients’ recurrent 
pain condition and the seriousness of their condition (e.g., “My stomach aches mean I 
have a serious illness”).  Items are rated on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all 
true” to “very true” and are summed to yield a total score.  Responses are scored such 
that high scores indicate appraisal of the condition as more serious.  
Secondary appraisal refers to perceived efficacy for coping with a stressor.  The 
Problem-Focused Coping Potential scale of the PBQ consists of six items referring to 
children’s perceived ability to ameliorate their pain (e.g., “When I have a bad stomach 
ache, there are ways I can get it to stop”).  The Emotion-Focused Coping Potential scale 
consists of six items referring to children’s perceived ability to live with an unremitting 
pain condition (e.g., “I know I can handle it no matter how bad my stomach hurts”).  
Items are rated on a five-point scale ranging from “not at all true” to “very true” and are 
summed to yield total scale scores.  Responses are scored such that high scores indicate 
appraisal of low coping potential.  
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Parental Report of Affective Problems and Somatic Complaints  
Because Pincus and Morley’s (2001) review of attentional bias studies with adult 
chronic pain patients suggests that differences between findings are due in part to study 
samples that are heterogeneous with respect to related emotional distress, levels of 
participants’ somatic and affective distress were examined.  To avoid priming children’s 
attention to threat words in the dot probe task, parents provided information regarding 
children’s trait affective distress and somatic complaints.  Using the client-entry version 
of the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001) on a computer, 
parents were asked to indicate the frequency of 118 problem behaviors in the past six 
months using a 3-point scale (“0 = not true,” “1 = somewhat or sometimes true,” and “3 = 
very true or often true”).  The CBCL is well standardized and has adequate reliability and 
validity (Achenbach, 1991).  It provides gender-based standard scores (T-scores) for eight 
scales of behavioral deviancy that are based on factor analytic findings.  Several scales 
are relevant to this study.  The attention problems scale includes ten items describing 
attention-related difficulties (e.g., “Can’t concentrate,” “Impulsive”).  The somatic 
complaints scale lists 11 somatic symptoms, including seven “physical problems without 
known medical cause” (e.g., “Rashes or other skin problems,” “Vomiting, throwing up”).  
The anxious/depressed scale contains 13 items measuring anxious and depressive 
symptoms (e.g., “Nervous, high-strung, or tense,” “Feels worthless”).  The 
withdrawn/depressed scale consists of eight items measuring anhedonic and other 
depressive symptoms (e.g.,” Enjoys little,” “Withdrawn”).  The social problems scale 
includes 11 items describing social difficulties (e.g., “Gets teased,” “Lonely”).  Although 
social problems have not been reported in children with RAP to date, this scale was 
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included in this study to examine the relation between social problems and participants’ 
attentional bias for social threat words in the Dot Probe Task.  In addition to these scales, 
several DSM-oriented scales were derived from the CBCL items for a number of 
disorders based on judgments by experienced child psychology and psychiatry 
researchers (Achenbach, Dumenci, & Rescorla, 2001).  Two of these DSM-oriented 
scales, anxiety problems and affective problems, are used to assess anxiety and 
depressive symptoms in participants.  Items in these scales are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. 
Items from the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) in the DSM-Oriented Anxiety 
Problems and Affective Problem Scales. 
 
Affective Problems*    Anxiety Problems* 
5. There is very little that he/she enjoys 11. Clings to adults or too dependent 
14. Cries a lot     29. Fears certain animals, situations, 
18. Deliberately harms self or         or places, other than school 
attempts suicide    30. Fears going to school 
24. Doesn’t eat well    45. Nervous, highstrung, or tense 
35. Feels worthless or inferior  50. Too fearful or anxious 
52. Feels too guilty    112. Worries 
54. Overtired 
76. Sleeps less than most kids 
77. Sleeps more than most kids during 
the day and/or night 
91. Talks about killing self 
100. Trouble sleeping 
102. Underactive, slow moving, or lacks energy 
103. Unhappy, sad, or depressed 
 
*Items numbers in the table correspond to item numbers on the CBCL 
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Demographic Information 
Parents completed a Demographic Form designed for this study to collect 
demographic information about participants and their families, including participants’ 
ethnicity and families’ socio-economic status. 
 
Procedure 
Following the protocol approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review 
Board, parents of eligible children learned about the study during their initial phone call with 
a member of the research team.  Interested families scheduled a visit to the Department of 
Psychology at a time that was convenient for them, and were sent a letter in the mail to 
confirm the date and time of their appointment and provide detailed directions to the 
building.  Upon arrival, an experimenter reviewed the study procedures with children and 
parents, including a brief overview of several other activities unrelated to this study.  
Informed assent was obtained from children and informed consent was obtained from 
parents.  Following consent procedures, parents were asked to join a second experimenter in 
another room to complete the Child Behavior Checklist and Demographic Information form, 
in addition to other measures unrelated to this study.  Children were asked to use the 
restroom to avoid any need to take breaks during the experiment.   
Next, children were invited to sit at a computer desk.  Chairs were set 60 centimeters 
from the computer screen.  The heights of the computer monitor and/or the chair were 
adjusted for adequate viewing of the monitor and optimum comfort.  Specifically, the 
computer monitor was adjusted so that its center was at children’s eye level, and the chair 
was adjusted so that children’s arms bent in right angles at their elbows when their hands 
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rested on the computer keyboard.  The experimenter applied sensors to three fingers of each 
child’s right or left hand to collect physiological information for a separate investigation.  
The sensors were not applied to children’s index fingers and therefore did not interfere with 
their participation in the current tasks.  During the study, children used their left and right 
index fingers on the “c” and “m” keys, respectively.  A halogen lamp was dimmed to a pre-
set low brightness to allow optimum viewing of the computer screen.   
Experimenters first administered the mood rating scale to children.  Next, children 
received instructions for the dot probe task, and completed the six instructional trials, 
followed by 12 practice trials.  They were given opportunities to ask questions during each, 
and before beginning the task.  Children were asked not to speak with the experimenter once 
they began the task.  The experimenter excused herself from the area to complete other work 
while the experiment took place.  When participants completed half of the task, they were 
given a one-minute break, during which they remained seated, but did not need to attend to 
the computer monitor.  Immediately following completion of the task, experimenters 
administered the Symptom Emotion Report.  Next, after completing several activities 
unrelated to this current study, participants completed the Word Game awareness check.  
Participants were then debriefed regarding the computer tasks and given an opportunity to 
ask questions.  To finish their session, participants completed the Reading Screener and 
Edinburgh Inventory with the experimenter.  Finally, parents rejoined their children in the 
study room and were given an opportunity to have any additional questions answered.  They 
were paid $50 for their travel to the session and time spent participating in the study.   
After the session, children ages 10 – 15 years were invited to complete 
questionnaire packets at home.  Children under 10 years were not invited to complete 
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these questionnaires as they might have difficulty reading questionnaires on their own.  
Eligible children in the RAP group were asked to complete several questionnaires, 
including the Manifest Anxiety Scale for Children and the Pain Beliefs Questionnaire.  
Questionnaires completed by eligible children in the Well group also included the 
Manifest Anxiety Scale for Children.  Addressed, stamped envelopes were provided for 
children to return the questionnaire packets by mail.  Children who returned 
questionnaire packets by mail or completed the questionnaires over the phone with an 
experimenter within ten days of the study session received a $20 gift card to Target.  
Children who completed the questionnaires after ten days received a $10 gift card to 
Target.  Of the 64 patients with RAP who were aged 10 years or older, sixty (93.8%) 
completed a questionnaire packet.  Of the 64 eligible Well children, 58 (90.6%) 
completed a questionnaire packet. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overview of Hypotheses to be Tested 
The proposed study seeks to examine attentional bias for threat words in children 
with RAP and pain-free children.  To summarize briefly, children with RAP are expected to 
demonstrate attentional bias to both physical and social threat words presented at a 
subliminal presentation rate, and show avoidance of physical threat words when compared 
with social threat words in the supraliminal presentation rate.  Secondly, children with RAP 
are expected to demonstrate stronger attentional bias toward subliminally presented physical 
and social threat words, and stronger attentional avoidance of supraliminally presented 
physical threat words than Well children.   
Regarding psychological correlates of attentional bias for threat, it is expected that 
higher negative affect before the dot probe task and higher levels of anxiety symptoms will 
be related to greater bias for subliminally presented physical and social threat words, and 
greater avoidance of supraliminally presented physical and social threat words.  Furthermore, 
for children with RAP, it is expected that more threatening beliefs about pain will be related 
to greater attentional bias to subliminally presented physical threat words, and greater 
attentional avoidance of supraliminally presented physical threat words.  In addition, 
exploratory analyses will examine the role of sex and age in attentional bias to threat words 
for children with RAP and pain-free children.  
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Participant Characteristics 
The ratio of female to male participants was greater in the RAP group (62% 
female) than in the Well group (43% female), χ2 (1) = 5.79, p < .05.  Means and standard 
deviations of other demographic characteristics and somatic, anxiety and depression 
symptom variables are presented in Table 3.  For CBCL and MASC variables, normative 
data (T scores) are reported in the table, although raw scores were used in analyses to 
maximize the variance of the scores.  A one-way ANOVA indicated that the RAP and 
Well groups did not differ with respect to mean age or reading screener score, Fs < 1.  It 
is also noteworthy that the groups did not differ significantly with respect to parents’ 
reports of attention problems, F (1, 151) = 1.57.  However, the difference in 
socioeconomic status approached significance, F = 3.67, p < .06, with parents in the RAP 
group reporting higher status on the 9-point Hollingshead index of parental occupation.  
Hollingshead index scores were not related to attentional bias scores (see below) for the 
RAP or Well group (rs ranged from -.17 to .16, ps > .10) and therefore were not 
considered further.   
Both child and parent reports generally reflected more somatic, anxious, and 
depressive symptoms in children with RAP compared with Well children.  Regarding 
somatic symptoms and somatic/physiological symptoms anxiety, children with RAP 
reported higher levels of GI symptoms at the time of the task, F (1, 156) = 13.61, p < 
.001, and greater physical anxiety symptoms on the MASC, F (1, 117) = 7.63, p < .01.  
Furthermore, their parents reported on the CBCL that children with RAP experience 
higher levels of somatic complaints, F (1, 151) = 62.48, p < .001.  Parents of children 
with RAP also reported that their children experience higher levels of anxiety/depressive 
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symptoms, F (1, 151) = 10.71, p < .01, withdrawn/depressive symptoms, F (1, 151) = 
8.98, p < .01, affective disorder symptoms, F (1, 151) = 21.44, p < .001, anxiety disorder 
symptoms, F (1, 151) = 15.02, p < .001, and social problems, F (1, 151) = 3.93, p < .05.  
At the time of the task, children with RAP reported lower levels of positive affect than 
Well children before and after the task, F (1, 156) = 4.52, p < .05 and 7.71, p < .01, 
respectively.  In addition, there was a trend for children with RAP to report a greater 
overall number of anxiety symptoms on the MASC than Well children, F (1, 117) = 3.51, 
p < .10.  These differences reflect the somatic, depressive, and anxious difficulties 
reported for children with RAP in the literature (e.g., Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006; 
Walker, Garber, Greene, 1993).   
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 
Response Latency Data Cleaning 
Procedures from other dot probe tasks were followed to remove outlier data that 
most likely reflect faulty responding (e.g., Mogg et al., 1995).  First, probe detection 
latencies less than 100 ms and greater than 4000 ms (4 seconds) were excluded.  
Response latencies less than 100 ms are thought to be impossibly fast, and may result 
from holding the response key from the previous trial or responding haphazardly or 
impulsively.  Similarly, latencies more than 4000 ms could be due to lapses in the 
participant’s attention, or difficulty with the keyboard’s functioning or the computer’s 
timing.  One response latency was faster than 100 ms and 51 response latencies were 
slower than 4000 ms.  Dropping these response latencies resulted in the removal of 
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Table 3. 
Participant Characteristics by Group. 
             
 RAP Group Well Group 
 M (SD) M (SD) 
       
Mean Age 11.79 (2.18) 11.78 (2.32) 
Mean Reading Screener score  8.00 (2.92)  8.21 (2.56) 
Hollingshead Index   5.19+ (1.17)  4.84+ (1.04) 
Positive Affect pre-DP  3.45a (0.61)  3.67a (0.69)  
Negative Affect pre-DP  1.52 (0.42)  1.54 (0.42) 
Positive Affect post-DP  3.14b (0.76)  3.46b (0.68) 
Negative Affect post-DP  1.36 (0.45)  1.42 (0.34) 
GI Symptoms post-DP  1.38c (0.66)  1.09c (0.25)  
Non-GI Symptoms post-DP  1.79 (0.59)  1.76 (0.56) 
Somatic Complaints T score (CBCL) 61.62c (8.46) 52.51c (4.27) 
Anxious/Depressed T score (CBCL) 57.95b (7.91) 54.28b (6.08) 
Withdrawn/Depressed T score (CBCL) 57.81b (8.89) 53.83b (5.63) 
Anxiety Problems T score (CBCL) 58.71c (7.75) 54.30c (5.99)  
Affective Problems T score (CBCL) 58.63c (7.82) 53.44c (5.69) 
Social Problems T score (CBCL) 56.10a (7.48) 53.70a  (5.91) 
Attention Problems T score (CBCL) 55.65 (7.10) 53.85 (6.29) 
Physical Anxiety Scale T-score (MASC)* 12.15b (7.30)  8.69b (6.30)  
Harm Avoidance Scale T-score (MASC)* 16.86 (5.38) 16.54 (5.03) 
Social Anxiety Scale T-score (MASC)* 12.66 (6.11) 11.65 (5.79) 
Separation/Panic Scale T-score (MASC)*  8.27 (5.06) 7.21 (4.78)  
Anxiety Disorder Index T-score (MASC)* 13.85 (5.07) 13.14 (4.38) 
Total Anxiety Scale T-score (MASC)* 49.94+ (17.79) 44.09+ (16.24) 
Primary Pain Condition Appraisal Score*  1.80 (0.75) N/A 
Primary Pain Episode Appraisal Score*  2.37 (0.84) N/A 
Problem-Focused Secondary Appraisal*  1.84 (1.02) N/A 
Emotion-Focused Secondary Appraisal*  2.46 (0.86) N/A 
             
DP = dot probe task; *Participants 10 years and older. 
p < .10+  p < .05a   p < .01b   p < .001c  
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0.41% of the 12,640 response latencies (80 threat word trials X 158 participants).   
Second, latencies of inaccurate responses (i.e., incorrectly noting the placement of the dot 
probe) were dropped from analyses, resulting in the removal of 478 response latencies 
(3.78% of total threat word trials).  Finally, to reduce the effect of within-participant 
outliers, response latencies greater than two standard deviations below and above each 
participant’s mean were removed.  There were 211 and 652 response latencies that fell 
below and above two standard deviations from the individual participants’ mean, 
respectively.  The average number of removed within-participant outlier response 
latencies was 5.5, and no participant had more than 10 responses dropped.  This resulted 
in the removal of 6.83% of the total response latencies for threat word trials.   
 
Validation of the Subliminal Condition 
To investigate whether participants could consciously read subliminally presented 
words and respond to the awareness check at a better-than-chance rate, mean response 
accuracy on the Lexical Decision (“Word Game”) task was calculated for each 
participant and compared to the expected range of scores for the task following the 
procedures of Boyer (2002).  With 18 trials in the task and a hypothetical probability of 
.50 being correct on each trial, the expected number of correct responses for each 
individual is 18 x .50 = 9.  The standard deviation of number of correct responses is the 
square root of (18 x .50 x .50) = 2.12.  The critical value of a two-tailed, .05 level t-test 
with 49 - 1 degrees of freedom is 1.98.  If participants are unable to consciously read the 
subliminally presented words and thus performing at chance level, 95% of participants 
should have correct responses between 9 + 1.98 x 2.12 and 9 - 1.98 x 2.12, or between 
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4.80 and 13.20.  For this sample, participants’ total number of correct responses ranged 
from 4 to 14; three participants (1.9% of the sample) had four correct scores, three 
participants (1.9% of the sample) had 14 correct scores, and 152 participants (96.2% of 
the sample) had correct scores within the expected range of 4.80 and 13.20.  Thus, the 
number of accurate responses fell within the expected range for more than 95% of the 
sample, suggesting that participants were not able to consciously read the words at this 
level of exposure.  The overall response accuracy for participants was 48.42%, which was 
significantly less than a chance response accuracy of 50.00%, t (157) = -2.16, p < .05, 
also suggesting that participants could not consciously read the words at this exposure 
level. 
 
Exploring Effects of Probe and Threat Word Position 
To examine participants’ attentional bias scores, mean response latencies were 
computed for each type of threat word, in each exposure condition, for all combinations 
of dot probe and threat word locations to examine the patterns of attentional bias scores.  
Average scores for each group are listed in Table 4.  To assess whether there are main 
effects for either threat word position or probe position, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted with these mean scores, using one between-
participants variable (RAP or Well group) and four within-participants variables: type of 
threat word (physical or social), length of word exposure (subliminal or supraliminal), 
threat word position (upper or lower) and probe position (upper or lower).  Main effects 
for threat word position or probe position could indicate that participants attended to  
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Table 4. 
Response Latencies by Group for Threat Word Trials. 
             
 RAP Well 
Exposure Threat Word Threat Word  Probe Response Response 
Condition Category Position  Position Latency  Latency 
        
Subliminal   Physical Upper Upper 681.86 680.44 
  Upper Lower 684.39 685.75 
  Lower Upper 660.85 687.73 
  Lower Lower 673.91 690.93 
 
   Social Upper Upper 663.27 688.74 
  Upper Lower 710.49 680.36 
  Lower Upper 691.76 702.38 
  Lower Lower 684.04 695.80 
 
Supraliminal   Physical Upper Upper 679.97 672.88 
  Upper Lower 667.02 663.75 
  Lower Upper 699.52 691.10 
  Lower Lower 666.47 681.74 
 
   Social Upper Upper 698.11 702.90 
  Upper Lower 672.64 675.76 
  Lower Upper 676.17 701.15   
  Lower Lower 690.43 672.80 
 
 
probes in one of the positions regardless of whether the threat word preceded a probe.  
The ANOVA was conducted with the untransformed response latency data and repeated 
with log transformations of the data.  The two sets of analyses produced the same pattern 
of results.  Untransformed data are presented here for ease of comprehension.  
Results indicated that there were no main effects for word position or probe 
position, indicating that the position of the threat word or the dot did not alone account 
for participants’ attention and response latency.  However, the effect of threat word type 
approached significance, F (1, 156) = 3.26, p < .10, indicating a trend for participants to 
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respond more quickly to physical threat words (mean response latency = 679.33 ms, SD 
= 220.57) than social threat words (mean response latency = 687.98 ms, SD = 240.61).  
In addition, there was a significant interaction between exposure level and dot position, F 
(1, 156) = 6.89, p =.01, partial η2 = .042.  Follow-up t-tests indicated that participants 
responded faster to trials in which the words were presented supraliminally (within 
consciousness) and the probe appeared in the lower position (Mean = 673.82 ms, SD = 
223.78) than they did when the words were presented supraliminally and the probe 
appeared in the upper position (Mean = 690.27 ms, SD = 237.71), t (157) = 2.29, p < .05, 
and when the words were presented subliminally (out of conscious awareness) and the 
probe appeared in the lower position (Mean = 688.21, SD = 239.24), t (157) = 2.11, p < 
.05.   
This interaction may reflect children’s typical practice of attending to information 
sequentially from top to bottom, such as when information is read from the top to the 
bottom of a page or computer screen.  Following this practice, participants may have read 
or at least attended to the top word followed by the bottom word.  If so, they could have 
more readily detected probes that replaced the bottom word during supraliminal trials 
because they had previously attended to the upper word and were attending to the lower 
word when the probe appeared.  Longer response latency to detect lower probes in 
subliminal trials (in which words were briefly presented and then masked by letters) 
could reflect the reduced time available for participants to attend to the bottom word by 
the time it was masked and the probe appeared such that participants were attending to 
the top word mask when the probe appeared in the lower position.  Some early dot probes 
tasks instructed participants to read the top word aloud and found main effects for threat 
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word position (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986).  Because probe and word position data are not 
typically specified in recent published attentional bias studies (which do not require 
participants to read the top word aloud) it is unknown whether similar findings have 
emerged in other studies.  Nonetheless, because these findings do not involve main 
effects of threat or probe position, they do not address a priori hypotheses based on 
previous studies and are not considered further (cf. Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & Macgregor-
Morris, 1990).   
 
Calculating Attentional Bias Scores 
Following standard procedures, continuous attentional bias scores were created by 
collapsing the dot probe position by threat word position (e.g., MacLeod & Matthews, 
1988).  For each participant, mean response latency data from each trial are entered into 
the equation below to compute a continuous attentional bias score.  This bias score 
reflects the magnitude of the attentional bias across all positions of the threat word and 
dot probe.  Bias is operationalized as the response latency to detect the dot probe when it 
appeared in the same position as the threat word subtracted from the latency to detect the 
dot probe when it appeared in the opposite position on the screen as the threat word.  
Greater bias on this task, as indexed by a stronger tendency to attend toward the threat 
word than the neutral word, is reflected by shorter response times to detect the probe 
when the probe appeared in the same position on the screen as the word to which 
participants were attending, and longer response times when the probe and attended-to 
word are in opposite positions on the screen.     
Attentional bias score = 1/2 [(UP/LT - UP/UT) + (LP/UT - LP/LT)] 
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In this equation, U = upper screen position, L = lower screen position, P = probe, 
and T = threat word.  Thus, UP/LT is equal to the mean reaction time for a single 
participant when the dot probe is in the upper position and the threat word is in the lower 
position.  In this equation, positive scores reflect an attentional bias toward threat, 
negative scores reflect a bias away from threat (i.e., avoidance of threat words), and a 
score of zero reflects no bias toward or away from threat.  Separate bias scores for 
physical and social threat words at both presentation rates (subliminal and supraliminal) 
were computed for each participant, resulting in a total of four attentional bias scores for 
each child: subliminal attentional bias for physical threat words, subliminal attentional 
bias for social threat words, supraliminal attentional bias physical threat words, and 
supraliminal attentional bias for social threat words.   
 
Attentional Bias Score Data Cleaning 
Because the Reading Screener scores for two participants with RAP were below 
third grade level, the four attentional bias scores for these participants were compared 
with the mean attentional bias scores for the RAP group to estimate whether their 
performance on the dot probe task was influenced by lower reading ability.  All four 
attentional bias scores for one participant (age 11, Reading Screener grade equivalency 
score = 2.65) were within two standard deviations of the respective mean attentional bias 
scores for the RAP group, and are therefore included in the following analyses.  In 
contrast, the supraliminal physical threat and subliminal social threat attentional bias 
scores for the other participant (age 8, Reading Screener grade equivalency score = 2.8) 
were beyond two standard deviations from the RAP group mean for these scores.  In 
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considering whether to retain this participants’ data in the following analyses, the 
performance of younger participants on the dot probe task was considered further (see 
below).  No Well children scored below the third grade level on the Reading Screener. 
To reduce the effect of between-participant extreme scores, outliers were 
calculated separately for the RAP and Well groups because of the a priori hypotheses that 
these populations differ in attentional bias to threatening information.  Group means for 
each threat word attentional bias score were calculated using participants’ mean 
attentional bias scores.  Participant scores that fell above or below two standard 
deviations from their respective group mean were omitted from further analyses.  
Following this procedure, 33 attentional bias scores (5.22% of the 158 participants’ four 
scores) were dropped from the analyses.  There were 11 Well participants and 9 
participants with RAP who had attentional bias scores dropped.  Eleven of these 
participants had one score dropped, five had two scores dropped, and four had three 
scores dropped.   
Cursory examination of these outlying data points indicated that nearly half (48%) 
of these data belonged to eight- or nine-year-old participants.  Furthermore, within each 
of the four attentional bias scores, the outlying data belonging to eight- or nine-year-old 
participants were not in uniform directions from the mean (i.e., for each type of 
attentional bias score, some outlying points were greater than and some were less than 
two standard deviations from the mean).  This raised suspicion that younger children 
responded differently to the dot probe task than older children.  However, year of age was 
not correlated with any of the attentional bias scores (rs ranged from -.15 to .10, ps > 
.20), suggesting that the larger discrepancies among eight- and nine-year-old participants’ 
 61 
scores from the group mean scores were not due to a relation between maturation and 
magnitude of attentional bias.   
Table 5 presents the number of participants of each year of age and their number 
of outlying data points.  A chi-square statistic comparing the observed number of 
between-participant outlying data points for each year of age with the predicted number 
of outlying data points for each year of age (based on the number of children each year 
age in the sample) was significant, χ2 (8) = 27.55, p < .005.  To further examine possible 
discrepancies between 8- and 9-year old participants and older participants, a second chi-
square statistic compared the number of outlying data points for 8-, 9-, and older 
participants (10- to 16-year-olds) with the predicted number of outlying data points for 
these three groups.  This chi-square also was significant, χ2 (2) = 20.06, p < .005, 
indicating that, compared to older participants, 8- and 9-year-old participants produced a 
greater than chance percentage of attentional bias scores that deviated from group mean 
attentional bias scores.     
 
Table 5. 
Between-participant Outlying Attentional Bias Scores. 
 Number of Outlying Scores     
Age Participants Number Percentage  
      
  8    5    5  25% 
  9  25  12  12% 
10  33    8    6% 
11  12    1    2% 
12  16    5    8% 
13  22    2    2% 
14  23    1    1% 
15  16    0    0% 
16    6    0    0% 
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Dropping these outlying data points from further analyses would result in the 
reduction of the eight and nine year old participants’ data by 25 and 12%, respectively, 
equal to more than 1.5 times the amount of data points removed for any other year of age 
group.  With such a disproportionately large percentage of data removed for the eight and 
nine year old participants, children of these ages would be less well represented in further 
analyses than older children.  Table 6 presents the RAP and Well groups’ mean 
attentional bias scores for all participants, for eight and nine year old participants, and for 
participants age ten and older.  Because eight and nine year old participants responded so 
differently to the task than the older participants, and because they would be poorly 
represented in further analyses following standard data cleaning procedures, the 
remaining analyses focus solely on children ages ten and older.   
 
Table 6. 
Attentional Bias Scores by Group and Age.*    
 Exposure Threat Word All Participants Older Younger 
 Condition Category Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
          
Well Subliminal Physical   1.05 (125.86)   19.55 (83.87) -68.58 (212.11) 
  Social - 0.90 (132.02) -19.92 (93.30)  70.73 (214.40) 
 Supraliminal Physical   0.11 (82.26) - 9.86 (76.64)  37.66 (93.86) 
  Social   0.61 (158.65)   7.00 (105.16) -23.46 (285.51) 
 
RAP Subliminal Physical - 5.26 (82.60) - 9.40 (71.29)  15.08 (126.47) 
  Social  27.47 (138.97)  16.60 (126.30)  80.98 (186.63) 
 Supraliminal Physical  10.05 (135.49)  26.26 (126.78) -69.74 (153.56) 
  Social -19.86 (137.12) -21.22 (145.41) -13.17 (89.46) 
             
* Data include outlier scores.  Older = older than nine years of age; younger = eight and 
nine years of age. 
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Between-participant outliers were calculated again for the RAP and Well groups, 
this time for participants ages ten and older only.  Group means for each threat word 
attentional bias score were calculated using participants’ mean attentional bias scores as 
discussed above.  Participant scores that fell above or below two standard deviations from 
their respective group mean were omitted from further analyses.  Following this 
procedure, 27 attentional bias scores (5.27% of the 128 participants’ four scores) were 
dropped from the analyses.  There were 8 Well participants and 9 participants with RAP 
who had attentional bias scores dropped.  Eleven of these participants had one score 
dropped, three had two scores dropped, two had three scores dropped, and one had four 
scores dropped.  Of the seven years of age groups (10 years to 16 years of age) in this 
sample, no year of age group had more than 9% of its total attentional bias scores 
removed. 
Table 7 lists group mean scores for each of the four attentional bias scores.  Also 
included are the percentage of participants within each group whose mean attentional bias 
score reflected avoidance of threat (i.e., scores less than zero) and attendance toward 
threat (i.e., scores greater than zero).  The group mean scores for each of the four 
attentional bias scores are also presented in Figure 1.  Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
were calculated to examine the relation among attentional bias scores within groups (see 
Tables 8 and 9 below).  The Well group did not demonstrate significant relations among 
attentional bias scores, ps > .10.  In contrast, for the RAP group, attentional bias for 
supraliminally presented physical threat words was positively related to attentional bias 
for subliminally presented physical threat words, r = .28, p <.05, and supraliminally 
presented social threat words, r = .27, p <.05.  The relation between subliminal physical 
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threat and supraliminal social threat attentional bias scores approached significance, r = 
.24, p <.10.  Subliminal social threat attentional bias scores were not significantly related 
to other attentional bias scores for the RAP group.     
 
Table 7. 
Mean Attentional Bias Scores by Group. 
 N Mean (SD) Range %Avoid %Attend 
       
Children with RAP 
Subliminal Exposure 
 Physical Threat 61  - 6.59 (62.66) -132.75 - 130.96 54.1 45.9 
 Social Threat 59   17.32 (94.32) -190.73 - 246.70 47.5 52.5 
Supraliminal Exposure 
 Physical Threat 62   28.27 (91.27) -204.25 - 228.38 41.9 58.1 
 Social Threat 61 -10.75 (84.91) -272.50 - 192.98 60.7 39.3 
 
Well Children 
Subliminal Exposure 
 Physical Threat 60  10.96 (63.33) -131.63 - 149.67 45.0 55.0 
 Social Threat 60 -17.82 (69.39) -197.41 - 132.00 58.3 41.7 
Supraliminal Exposure  
 Physical Threat 61 - 6.09 (61.96) -161.04 - 140.13 59.0 41.0 
 Social Threat 61 - 3.67 (61.29) -153.17 - 170.25 55.7 44.3 
             
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 
Nature of Attentional Bias by Group 
The continuous attentional bias scores were used to test each of the hypotheses 
regarding attentional bias for threat words.    To test the first hypothesis regarding the 
degree of attentional bias scores compared to a neutral attentional stance or absence of 
attentional bias, t-tests compared each of the group mean attentional bias scores to a score  
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   Figure 2. Attentional Bias Scores by Group. 
 
of zero.  Contrary to predictions, results indicated that children with RAP demonstrated 
attentional bias toward supraliminally presented physical threat words, t (61) = 2.44, p < 
.05.  Also in contrast to predictions, attentional bias scores for subliminally presented 
physical and social threat words and supraliminally presented social threat words were 
not significantly different from zero for the RAP group.  Well children demonstrated a 
trend to avoid subliminally presented social threat words, t (59) = -1.99, p = .051.  
Attentional bias scores for subliminally presented physical threat words and 
supraliminally presented physical and social threat words were not significantly different 
from zero for the Well group.  Thus, compared to a neutral attentional stance, participants 
with RAP demonstrated a bias only for threat words that are specific to their pain 
condition, and this bias was not demonstrated by Well children.  However, the bias 
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reflected attention toward physical threat words, as opposed to attentional avoidance of 
physical threat words demonstrated previously in children with RAP.   
 
Comparison of Attentional Bias Scores 
To test the second hypothesis regarding expectations that children with RAP 
demonstrate stronger attentional bias for threat words than Well children, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA explored differences between the groups with respect to the 
types of threat word (physical and social) and lengths of word presentation (subliminal or 
supraliminal).  Gender was also included as a between-participants factor.  As expected, 
the ANOVA yielded a three-way interaction effect for group, threat word type, and 
length of word presentation, F (1, 109) = 5.66, p < .05.  In addition, there was a 
significant interaction of group, length of presentation, and gender, F (1, 109) = 11.16, p 
< .01.  However, the four-way interaction between group, gender, threat word type and 
length of presentation was not significant, F < 1.  Furthermore, there were no significant 
main effects, indicating that differences between the two groups’ attentional bias scores 
depended jointly upon the length of word presentation and gender or the type of threat 
word.   
To investigate the content-specificity of attentional bias to threat and determine 
whether patients with RAP demonstrated stronger attentional bias to threat words than 
Well participants, the effect of group was explored first for each exposure and threat 
word category.  Results showed that children with RAP demonstrated greater attentional 
bias toward supraliminally presented physical threat words than Well children, F (1, 121) 
= 5.95, p < .05 (RAP group mean = 28.27, SD = 91.27; Well group mean = -6.09, SD = 
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61.96).  Further, patients with RAP demonstrated greater attentional bias toward 
subliminally presented social threat words than Well children, F (1, 117) = 5.37, p < .05 
(RAP group mean = 17.32, SD = 94.32; Well group mean = -17.82, SD = 69.39).  
Contrary to predictions, children with RAP did not differ from Well children in 
attentional bias for subliminally presented physical threat words or supraliminally 
presented social threat words.  A separate ANOVA examining the effect of group for 
gender and length of presentation did not reveal significant differences. 
To investigate subliminal and supraliminal threat orienting, attentional bias scores 
at different exposures were examined within the RAP and Well groups separately.  For 
the RAP group, the ANOVA indicated a significant interaction effect for threat type and 
exposure level, F (54) = 4.89, p < .05.  No main effects were found.  Follow-up 
ANOVAs indicated that, when words were presented within conscious awareness, 
patients with RAP demonstrated greater attentional bias toward physical threat words 
than social threat words, F (1, 57) = 5.22, p < .05.  At the subliminal level, patients with 
RAP did not discriminate between physical and social threat words, F (57) = 2.13, p = 
.15.  Thus, patients with RAP did not discriminate between subliminally presented 
physical and social threat words, but when they could consciously read the threat words, 
they demonstrated more attentional bias for physical threat words than they did toward 
social threat words.   
For the Well group, an ANOVA indicated a main effect for threat word type, F 
(55) = 4.16, p < .05.  Follow-up ANOVAs indicated that, when words were presented 
subliminally, Well children demonstrated greater attentional avoidance of social threat 
words than physical threat words, F (56) = 4.75, p < .05.  Well children did not 
 68 
discriminate between physical and social threat words presented at the supraliminal 
presentation rate, F (59) < 1.  Thus, Well children demonstrated greater attentional 
avoidance of social threat words than physical threat words when words were presented 
out of conscious awareness, but did not discriminate between supraliminally presented 
physical and social threat words. 
 
Correlates of Attentional Bias for Threat 
The third main set of hypotheses involved the relations of attentional bias to state 
affect and somatic symptoms and trait levels of somatic, anxiety and affective symptoms.  
For both groups of children, it was expected that greater attentional bias scores would be 
associated with less positive affect and more negative affect at the time of the task, and 
greater reports of anxiety and other internalizing symptoms.  Furthermore, for patients with 
RAP, it was predicted that stronger attentional bias for physical threat words would be 
associated with greater GI and non-GI somatic symptoms and greater perceptions of pain 
threat associated with their recurrent pain condition.  In addition, relations between 
attentional bias and demographic and illness variables were assessed to investigate 
alternative explanations of threat bias and to clarify the nature of attentional bias in this 
sample.   
First, the relation of attentional bias scores to the number of days separating 
participants’ initial assessment and completion of the attentional bias task was investigated.  
For the RAP group, no relation was found between attentional bias for supraliminally 
presented threat words and days between data collection points (r = .08 and -.17 for physical 
and social threat attentional bias, respectively, ns).  However, an inverse relation was found 
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between subliminal attentional bias scores and number of days between data collection 
points.  Greater attention toward subliminal physical threat was related to fewer days 
between data collection points (r = -.27, p <.05).  In addition, there was a trend toward 
significance for a similar relation of attentional bias for subliminal social threat to number of 
days between assessment points (r = -.23, p <.10).  Thus, when compared with patients who 
completed the dot probe task after more time had passed since their initial clinic 
appointment, patients who completed the task closer in time to their clinic appointment 
demonstrated greater attentional bias toward these threat words when they were presented at 
the subliminal exposure level.  No significant relations were found between any of the four 
attentional bias scores and number of days between data collection points for the Well group 
(rs ranged from -.09 to .14, ps > .10). 
Next, the time of day that participants completed the dot probe task and its relation to 
attentional bias scores were examined.  Appointment times ranged from 9:00 a.m. to 6:30 
p.m. for the RAP group, and from 9:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. for the Well group. The median 
appointment time was 1:30 p.m. for the RAP group and 1:00 p.m. for the Well group.  For 
patients with RAP, the time of day that the task was completed was negatively related to 
attentional bias for supraliminally presented physical threat words, r = -.27, p <.05.  Thus, 
earlier task completion times were associated with greater attention toward physical threat 
words when these words were presented within conscious awareness.  Exploratory analyses 
conducted to gain insight into this finding revealed that none of the affect (i.e., positive and 
negative affect before and after the task) or somatic symptom (GI and non-GI somatic 
symptoms) assessments from the lab visit were related to the time of day that the task was 
completed, rs ranged from = -.01 to .24, ps >.05.  For Well children, no relation was found 
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between the time of day that the task was completed and any of the attentional bias scores.   
For the Well group, year of age was positively related to supraliminal social threat 
attentional bias scores, r = .34, p <.01.  This relation reflects the trend for older participants 
to demonstrate more attention toward supraliminal social threat scores and younger children 
to demonstrate more avoidance of supraliminal social threat scores.  This association was not 
found for the RAP group.  No other demographic variable demonstrated a significant relation 
with any of the attentional bias scores.     
Tables 8 and 9 respectively present correlations between attentional bias scores and 
psychological variables measured in both groups.  Regarding children’s self-reported affect 
before and after the task, surprisingly few relations with attentional bias scores were found 
for the RAP and Well groups.  For the Well group, children who reported less positive affect 
before the task demonstrated stronger attentional bias toward subliminally presented physical 
threat words, r = -.30, p <.05.  For the RAP group, no significant associations were found 
between affect and attentional bias for threat words. 
Next, the relation of participants’ attentional bias for threat words to GI and non-GI 
somatic symptoms at the time of the dot probe task was investigated.  For the RAP group, 
there was a negative relation of attentional bias for supraliminally presented social threat 
words to levels of non-GI somatic symptoms, r = -.38, p <.01.  This reflects a relation of 
greater attention toward threat to lower non-GI somatic symptom report at the time of the 
task, and of avoidance of threat to greater non-GI somatic symptom report at the time of the 
task.  There were no significant associations between somatic symptoms and attentional bias 
for the Well group.  
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Table 8. 
Correlations among Attentional Bias Scores, Psychological Variables, and Demographic Variables for the RAP Group. 
AB = Attentional bias; DP = dot probe task; Anx = Anxiety; Sx = Symptoms.  p < .10+  p < .05a   p < .01b   p < .001c    
                    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. Sub Physical AB -                  
2. Supra. Physical AB  .28a   -               
3. Sub. Social AB  .07 -.10   - 
4. Supra. Social AB  .24+  .27a -.17   - 
5. Child Age -.05 -.13 -.10 -.02   -    
6. Pos. Affect pre-DP  .10  .03 -.04  .04 -.05   - 
7. Neg. Affect pre-DP -.06 -.11 -.03 -.01 -.10  .13   - 
8. Pos. Affect post-DP -.02 -.08  .01  .01 -.02  .64c -.10   - 
9. Neg. Affect post-DP -.06 -.19 -.02 -.21+ -.25a  .10  .60c -.13   -  
10. GI Sx post-DP -.02 -.23+  .09 -.18 -.24+ -.06  .24+ -.13  .49c   -  
11. Non-GI Sx post-DP -.16 -.19  .06 -.38b -.09  .03  .52c -.10  .62c  .40b   -              
12. Physical Anx. Sx. -.26+ -.40b  .07 -.12  .05 -.25+  .32a -.05  .26a  .33b  .43b   -  
13. Social Anxiety -.10 -.14  .23+ -.20 -.18 -.23+  .29a -.19  .50c  .27a  .38b  .42b    - 
14. Separation/Panic -.07 -.07  .00 -.18 -.37b -.10  .28a -.11  .43b  .07  .39b  .33a  .55c   -      
15. Anx. Disorder Index -.13 -.21  .05 -.11 -.26+ -.05  .22+  .01  .45c  .29a  .45c  .56c  .81c  .68c   -     
16. MASC Total -.15 -.26a  .11 -.20 -.28+ -.13  .35b -.06  .51c  .31a  .48c  .71c  .81c  .77c  .92c -        
17. Somatic Complaints -.17 -.19  .14 -.21  .10 -.18  .12 -.17 -.08 -.08  .00  .25+  .12  .01  .03 .13 -   
18. Anxiety/Depression  .06  .07  .08 -.26a -.05 -.31a  .05 -.18  .11  .28a  .24+  .29a  .29a  .09  .19 .26+ .36b -      
19. Withdrawn/Depress. -.21 -.13  .11 -.25+  .20 -.44c -.02 -.24+ -.10  .15  .01  .33a  .13 -.04  .00 .12 .51c .67c -     
20. DSM Anx. Problems  .11  .06  .05 -.12 -.15 -.21  .07 -.11  .11  .22+  .22+  .33a  .34b  .24+  .31a .38b .34b .89c .52c -    
21. DSM Affect Probs. -.19 -.16  .07 -.24+  .13 -.40b -.01 -.23+ -.07  .22+  .11  .28a  .11 -.04  .04 .11 .46c .72c .81c .53c -   
22. Social Problems -.09 -.07  .17 -.32a -.21 -.26a  .14 -.12  .12  .34b  .31a  .39b  .29a  .37b  .31a .44b .40b .62c .47c .68c .43c - 
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Table 9. 
Correlations among Attentional Bias Scores, Psychological Variables, and Demographic Variables for the Well Group. 
AB = Attentional bias; DP = dot probe task; Anx = Anxiety; Sx = Symptoms.  p < .10+  p < .05a   p < .01b   p < .001c    
                    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. Sub Physical AB -                  
2. Supra. Physical AB -.08   -                
3. Sub. Social AB -.19 -.02   -    
4. Supra. Social AB -.05  .10 -.21   -   
5. Child Age -.07  .07  .09  .34b   -   
6. Pos. Affect pre-DP -.30a  .18 -.09 -.08 -.38b   -  
7. Neg. Affect pre-DP -.16  .08  .01  .03  .13  .18   -  
8. Pos. Affect post-DP -.05 -.12 -.14 -.13 -.50c  .67c  .03   - 
9. Neg. Affect post-DP  .07  .01 -.20 -.13  .01  .01  .42b  .05   - 
10. GI Sx post-DP -.05  .03 -.23+ -.15 -.09  .16  .12  .17  .13   - 
11. Non-GI Sx post-DP -.10  .15 -.14 -.12 -.16  .25a  .13  .23+  .13  .31a   -              
12. Physical Anx. Sx.  .02  .19 -.05 -.26+ -.23+  .27a  .19  .21 -.01  .14  .27a     -  
13. Social Anxiety -.06  .25+  .06 -.37b -.22  .22  .10 -.03 -.08 -.07  .02  .49c   - 
14. Separation/Panic  .09  .17 -.30a -.14 -.46c  .24+ -.08  .21 -.04  .10  .11  .36b .46c   -     
15. Anx. Disorder Index  .00  .30a -.08 -.24+ -.22+  .26a  .02  .14 -.11  .13  .20  .52c .70c .74c   -   
16. MASC Total  .01  .25+ -.10 -.29a -.37b  .34a  .07  .21 -.06  .08  .15  .72c .81c .76c  .88c   -        
17. Somatic Complaints -.03 -.15  .13 -.01 -.01 -.02 -.11 -.12 -.02 -.04 -.15  .02 .17 .07  .08  .03   - 
18. Anxiety/Depression -.04 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.15  .18  .01  .05 -.04  .01 -.01  .12 .24+ .23+  .15  .15 .58c   -     
19. Withdrawn/Depress. -.16 -.03  .22 -.07  .19 -.12  .00 -.29a -.02 -.07 -.06  .00 .04 .02 -.09 -.08 .47c .53c   -    
20. DSM Anx. Problems -.10  .02 -.16 -.03 -.15  .19 -.12  .15 -.02  .12  .05  .08 .18 .20  .11  .13 .42b .82c .38b   -    
21. DSM Affect Probs. -.04 -.07  .02 -.16  .06 -.02 -.01 -.19 -.03 -.05  .04  .04 .04 .04 -.06 -.09 .62c .65c .82c .48c   -   
22. Social Problems -.03  .10  .00 -.07 -.13  .20  .02 -.04  .02  .08  .09  .23+ .25+ .23+  .17  .20 .70c .78c .62c .71c .74c   - 
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Attentional bias scores demonstrated several significant relations with participants’ 
reports of anxiety on the MASC.  For the RAP group, supraliminal physical threat attentional 
bias scores were negatively related to physical anxiety symptoms, r = -.40, p <.01.  In 
addition, there was a significant negative relation of supraliminal physical threat bias to total 
scores on the MASC, r = -.26, p <.05.  These associations suggest that avoidance of physical 
threat at the supraliminal level was associated with higher levels of physical anxiety 
symptoms.  In contrast, no significant associations were found for the RAP group between 
social threat bias and anxiety scores.   
Different relations emerged for the Well group between attentional bias scores and 
MASC anxiety scores.  In contrast to the RAP group, supraliminal physical threat bias was 
positively related to anxiety scores.  Specifically, Well children who demonstrated more bias 
toward physical threat words had higher Anxiety Disorder Index scores, r = .30, p <.05.  In 
contrast to this positive relation, attentional bias for supraliminal and subliminal social threat 
demonstrated negative relations with anxiety scores.  Well children who demonstrated more 
avoidance of supraliminal social threat reported more social anxiety, r = -.37, p <.01, and 
higher MASC total scores, r = -.29, p <.05.  At the subliminal level, Well children who 
demonstrated more avoidance of social threat words reported higher levels of separation 
anxiety/panic symptoms, r = -.30, p <.05.   
Parent-reported internalizing symptoms demonstrated significant associations only 
with attentional bias for supraliminally presented social threat words, and these associations 
were found only for patients with RAP.   Specifically, greater avoidance of supraliminal 
social threat was significantly related to higher Anxiety/Depression, r = -.26, p <.05, and 
Social Problem scores, r = -.32, p <.05.  Contrary to predictions, attentional bias for physical 
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threat was not related to parental report of these internalizing symptoms nor children’s 
somatic complaints. 
Finally, for the RAP group, relations among attentional bias and perceptions of 
pain threat were assessed.  Based on the conceptual framework of Eccleston and 
Crombez (1999), it was expected that beliefs regarding severity of pain episodes, severity 
of chronic pain condition and efficacy for coping with pain as assessed by the PBQ 
would be related to attentional bias for subliminally and supraliminally presented 
physical threat words.  Results appear in Table 10.  A significant relation was found for 
beliefs regarding pain condition severity to attentional bias for supraliminal physical 
threat words.  Patients who perceived their pain condition as more serious demonstrated 
greater attentional avoidance of supraliminally presented physical threat words, r = -.30, 
p <.05.  No other significant associations were found between attentional bias and pain 
beliefs. 
 
Table 10.  
Correlations among Attentional Bias Scores and Pain Belief Variables. 
       1    2    3    4     5    6    7    8 
             
1. Sub. Physical AB     - 
2. Supra. Physical AB   .28a    - 
3. Sub. Social AB   .07 -.10    - 
4. Supra. Social AB   .24+  .27a -.17    - 
5. Condition Ap.  -.14 -.30a -.08 -.16    -     
6. Episode Ap.  -.10 -.12 -.11 -.03  .65c    -  
7. Prob-Focus Cope Ap. -.03  .03  .10 -.01 -.28a -.59c     - 
8. Emo-Focus Cope Ap.  .07 -.05  .02  .05 -.36b -.68c -.58c   - 
             
AB = Attentional Bias; Ap. = Appraisal.  p < .10+  p < .05a   p < .01b   p < .001c 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Nature of Attentional Orienting to Threat 
This is the first study to use a laboratory task to compare children with RAP and 
pain-free children in their vigilance for physical threat.  The study compared RAP and 
pain-free children with respect to three characteristics of attentional orienting to threat: 
(a) direction of bias toward versus away from threat, (b) specificity of bias for physical 
versus social threat, and (c) temporal features of attention (i.e., threat presented at 
subliminal and supraliminal levels).  The association of physical threat attentional bias to 
state and trait levels of affect and anxiety and somatic symptoms was also examined.  
Results are discussed with respect to current models of chronic pain and potential 
implications of attentional bias for threat in children with RAP. 
Study results support the hypothesis that children with chronic pain differ from 
healthy peers in attentional orienting to pain and somatic information.  When words were 
presented within conscious awareness, patients with RAP demonstrated significantly 
greater attention to physical threat words compared to neutral words matched for word 
length and reading difficulty.  In addition, patients with RAP exhibited significantly 
greater attentional bias to supraliminal physical threat than to supraliminal social threat.  
In contrast, RAP patients’ attentional orienting to supraliminal social threat words did not 
differ from their attentional orienting to matched neutral words or from Well participants’ 
orienting toward supraliminal social threat words.  These findings support the idea that 
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patients with RAP are characterized by a bias to threat that is specific to their chronic 
pain condition rather than reflecting a more general attentional bias to any type of 
threatening information.  Furthermore, patients with RAP demonstrated greater bias to 
physical threat words than Well children, whose attentional orienting to supraliminal 
physical threat words did not differ from their orienting to matched neutral words.  Thus, 
the pattern of attention observed in RAP patients appears to be related to their experience 
of chronic pain and does not reflect a typical childhood response to pain-related 
information.   
Models of chronic pain (e.g., Eccleston & Crombez, 1999; Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 
1997) and anxiety disorders (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999) propose that these 
patients are biased to attend toward pain or other potentially negative information 
because of an oversensitive threat appraisal system that more readily assesses incoming 
stimuli as highly threatening and thereby causes and/or maintains facilitated engagement 
with and impaired disengagement from threatening information that is relevant to the 
patient’s disorder.  Results of this study provide evidence to support the presence of such 
a bias in children with RAP.  The effect of this bias may include more frequent 
interruption of attention by pain sensations (Eccleston and Crombez, 1999).  For children 
with poor ability to regulate the focus of their attention, more frequent interruption by 
pain may increase their focus on pain sensations, thereby increasing their anxiety and 
fear, which in turn can magnify subjective pain intensity (Walker, 1999; Zeltzer, Bursch, 
et al., 1997). 
The study’s finding of attentional bias for physical threat in children with RAP is 
in line with findings from several studies in the adult chronic pain literature, in which 
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pain patients with pain demonstrated slowed color-naming responses to pain words 
relative to neutral words on a modified Stroop task (Beck et al., 2001; Crombez et al., 
2000; Pincus, Fraser, & Pearce, 1998; Pearce & Morley, 1989).  However, results from 
other Stroop and from dot probe tasks have not replicated these findings, showing no 
evidence for interference (Duckworth et al., 1997) or no evidence for interference or bias 
until anxiety or depression levels were statistically controlled (Snider et al., 2000; 
Asmundson et al., 1997).  The heterogeneity of pain disorders included in adult pain 
threat bias studies (e.g., musculoskeletal pain due to injury, Snider et al., 2000; chronic 
low back pain, Crombez et al., 2000) and the varying methodologies used may help 
explain the inconsistent findings in the adult literature (Pincus & Morley, 2001).  
 Given the high incidence of anxiety symptoms and disorders in RAP patients 
(e.g., Hodges, Kline, Barbero, & Woodruff, 1985; Walker et al., 1993), the literature on 
attentional bias associated with anxiety disorders also is relevant for comparison to the 
present study’s findings. As one might expect given the overlap between RAP and 
anxiety, the bias toward threat demonstrated by patients with RAP in this study is 
consistent with attentional bias toward threat demonstrated by child and adult patients 
with anxiety disorders (see Hadwin, Garner, & Perez-Olivas, 2006, and Mogg & Bradley, 
1998, 1999 for reviews of the child and adult anxiety literature, respectively).  At 
supraliminal presentation rates, research has consistently shown that children with 
anxiety disorders have a bias to attend toward threat (e.g., Vasey et al., 1996, Dalgleish et 
al., 2003).  Also at supraliminal presentation rates, research has shown that adults with 
anxiety disorders have a bias specifically for threatening information that is associated 
with their personal concerns (e.g., MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et al., 1992).  
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Thus, the relation of attentional bias toward physical threat found in this study for 
patients with RAP appears consistent with findings from studies of attentional bias in 
pediatric and adult anxiety disorders regarding attentional bias toward personally relevant 
threat. 
In contrast, the only study to date that investigated attentional biases in children 
with RAP found that patients demonstrated attentional bias toward subliminally presented 
pain words, and attentional bias away from supraliminally presented pain words (Boyer, 
2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  Nonetheless, findings from the current study are consistent 
with the initial hypotheses set forth by Boyer, namely, that patients with RAP would 
demonstrate attentional biases toward supraliminal physical threat words.  Although 
many similarities existed between this study and Boyer’s study, there were differences 
between the study samples and procedure that may account for the differences in 
outcomes.    
The patient samples in the current study and Boyer’s study (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et 
al., 2006) were comparable in that they were composed of tertiary care patients and were 
similar with respect to patients’ age, sex, and parent-reported anxious/depressive and 
somatic symptoms, and parental occupations.  However, only patients with functional 
diagnoses completed the current study, whereas approximately 30% of patients in the 
Boyer study had an organic diagnosis.  Although Boyer reported that functional versus 
organic diagnosis was not found to be related to attentional biases, it is unknown whether 
additional participants and greater statistical power would have revealed significant 
differences between the diagnostic groups.  In addition, the current study was conducted 
in the Southeast region of the United States, while the Boyer study was conducted in the 
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Northeast, and it is possible that regional differences are related to differences in task 
performance.  Thus, differences between the studies’ patient samples may have 
contributed to differences in findings regarding attentional bias for threat. 
Regarding study procedures, the dot probe task used in the Boyer study was 
nearly duplicated for the current study with the exception of the stimuli used.  The current 
study used the same categories of threat words, stimulus display format, and timing of 
stimulus exposures as the Boyer study.  However, only 17 of the 20 physical threat words 
and 12 of the 20 social threat words in this study appeared in the lists of 32 pain and 32 
social threat words in the Boyer study.  This resulted in only 53% and 37.5% overlap of 
physical and social threat stimuli, respectively, with the Boyer study.  In addition, threat 
words in the current study included only those that received a specified level of negative 
valence ratings by children aged eight to fourteen, whereas threat word valence ratings in 
the Boyer study were obtained from undergraduate students whose perspective of threat 
may differ from that of children and adolescents.  As reviewed above, theory (e.g., 
Eccleston & Crombez, 1999) and evidence (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) suggest that the 
threat value of a stimulus is important in determining the extent to which it will capture 
and/or hold attention.  Thus, potential differences in the threat value of stimuli may have 
resulted in differences in patterns of attentional bias to threat across studies.   
Patients in this sample did not demonstrate attentional bias for physical threat 
words when they were presented subliminally, that is, outside of conscious awareness.  
This finding contrasts with the attentional bias toward pain words found in Boyer’s study 
of patients with RAP (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  Studies examining 
methodological factors involved in eliciting attentional bias for threat in the laboratory 
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suggest that the combination of physical threat stimuli and subliminal exposure level used 
in this study may have been ineffective in capturing the earliest moments in which 
patients’ attention connects with physical threat.  As reviewed above, one attentional bias 
study found that, in addition to individuals’ anxiety levels, patterns of attentional 
orienting toward or away from threatening pictures was related to the pictures’ threat 
intensity (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003).  In addition, a study using an exogenous cueing 
task to examine attentional engagement and disengagement in healthy participants 
demonstrated that, at 100ms exposure levels, high trait anxious participants more strongly 
engaged their attention to threatening pictures and showed impaired disengagement from 
threatening pictures than low trait anxiety participants, whereas at 200ms and 500ms 
exposure levels, high trait anxious participants showed a stronger tendency to avoid 
threatening pictures (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006).  
The threat level of pain words used in Boyer’s study may be more effective in capturing 
the first moments in which patients with RAP attend toward physical threat.  Additional 
research is necessary to identify the levels of subliminal exposure and/or threat intensity 
at which children with RAP demonstrate subliminal attentional bias to threat. 
To investigate whether patients with RAP are biased to attend specifically toward 
physical threat or for any form of threat, attentional orienting was also investigated for 
social threat.  At the subliminal level, when compared with the responses of Well 
children, patients with RAP showed significantly more bias toward social threat words.  
This finding may have been expected given the significant association of social 
competence to levels of somatic symptom reported by patients with RAP.  For example, a 
prospective study investigating the effects of negative life events on patients’ symptom 
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reports found that higher levels of negative events were associated with higher levels of 
somatic complaints for patients with low levels of social competence (Walker, Garber & 
Greene, 1994).  Another study found that patients’ perceived social, academic, and/or 
athletic competence played an important role in the relation of irritable bowel syndrome 
symptoms to functional disability.  Specifically, for children with lower levels of 
perceived competence, more symptoms were related to more disability (Claar, Walker & 
Smith, 1999).  To the extent that the social threat words used in the current study overlap 
with deficits in social, academic and athletic competence, patients with RAP may be 
expected to perceive these words as threatening and demonstrate more attentional bias 
toward them than Well participants.   
In contrast, patients with RAP in this study did not differ from Well participants 
in their attentional orienting toward supraliminal social threat words.  The difference in 
subliminal versus supraliminal orienting for social threat in patients with RAP may 
reflect a lower threshold for attentional capture of social threat or a difficulty disengaging 
from social threat that patients can strategically override when social threat reaches 
consciousness (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999).  The greater relevance of physical 
versus social threat words to chronic pain patients may at least partially explain why 
patients with RAP demonstrated bias toward physical threat words but not social threat at 
the supraliminal level (e.g., Pincus & Morely, 2001; see also Mathews & Klug, 1993; 
Riemann & McNally, 1995).  Consistent with this finding of RAP patients’ attentional 
bias toward subliminal social threat, adult patients with anxiety disorders demonstrate 
bias toward general forms of subliminal threat and bias toward supraliminal threat that is 
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associated with their personal concerns (e.g., MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mogg et al., 
1992).     
In summary, when they could consciously read the words, patients with RAP 
demonstrated attentional bias toward physical threat, and did not demonstrate attentional 
bias for social threat.  Attentional bias for physical threat was not found in Well children, 
suggesting that it is unique to chronic pediatric pain conditions.  Furthermore, patients 
with RAP showed more attention toward social threat at the subliminal level than Well 
children.  This pattern of attentional bias in patients with RAP is consistent with findings 
from the anxiety disorder literature demonstrating that patients with clinical anxiety 
disorders attend to general forms of threat at the subliminal exposure level and to threat 
that is specific to their domain of personal concern at the supraliminal level.  Also, the 
pattern of attentional bias for physical threat found in this study is consistent with some 
of the findings from adult chronic pain studies, but is inconsistent with the only study 
examining pediatric patients with RAP to date, perhaps due to differences in threat 
stimuli.  
 
Correlates of Attentional Bias for Threat 
To understand patterns of attentional orienting to physical threat, the relation of 
attentional bias for physical and social threat to current affect, anxiety and somatic 
symptoms, and pain beliefs was investigated.  First, based on Boyer’s (2002) findings and 
the assumption that negative affect would prime threat bias, it was expected that 
attentional bias for threat would be greater for patients with higher levels of negative 
affect at the time of study participation.  However, neither negative nor positive affect 
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was related to attentional bias for threat in the current study.  This suggests that patients 
with RAP may have an attentional bias toward supraliminal physical threat and 
subliminal social threat irrespective of current affect.  To more explicitly investigate 
whether current affect is relevant for attentional bias for threat, laboratory tasks should be 
used to manipulate mood and observe its effect on attentional bias (Boyer, 2002).    
Contrary to predictions, neither GI nor non-GI symptoms reported at the time of 
the task were related to attentional bias for physical threat for patients with RAP.  
Unexpectedly,, levels of non-GI symptoms were inversely related to supraliminal social 
threat bias.  It is possible that although school children rated threat words in both 
categories as equally negative, patients with RAP perceive social threat words as more 
distressing than physical threat words and that they therefore are more likely to trigger 
somatic symptoms (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  If so, patients’ attentional 
avoidance of social threat words on the computer screen may be effective in managing 
their social-related distress, but result in increased levels of somatic symptoms.  It is also 
possible that patients with RAP who avoided supraliminal social threat had more 
attentional reserves to notice higher levels of somatic symptoms, whereas patients who 
attended toward social threat were less apt to notice and report somatic symptoms.  This 
explanation appears less plausible given findings from a daily diary study in which 
patients with RAP reported more somatic symptoms in response to social and other 
stressors than healthy peers (Walker, Garber, Smith, Van Slyke, & Claar, 2001).  Also, 
analysis of the most concerning stressor reported by these patients indicated that pain and 
somatic symptoms are more significant concerns of patients than social and other 
stressors (Lipani et al., 2004).  Nonetheless, patients with RAP may be unable to 
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recognize and report the degree to which they are concerned with social stressors. In 
summary, findings showed an inverse relation of supraliminal social threat bias to current 
non-GI symptoms, and attentional bias toward supraliminal physical threat regardless of 
current GI and non-GI symptoms.  
Regarding patients’ trait anxiety, attentional bias for physical threat words was 
related only to child-reported physical anxiety symptoms.  Contrary to predictions, this 
relation was negative.  Thus, when the words were presented within awareness, 
avoidance of physical threat was related to higher trait levels of physical anxiety 
symptoms, and attention toward physical threat was related to lower trait levels of 
physical anxiety symptoms.  This pattern is consistent with models of coping responses to 
pain and stress in which efforts that involve attention directed toward pain, such as 
cognitive restructuring, are associated with less anxiety (e.g., Suls & Fletcher, 1985; 
Thomsen et al., 2002).  The lower levels of anxiety may be the result of desensitization or 
habituation to the noxious sensations of pain (Kabat-Zinn, 1982); in contrast, avoidance 
of physical threat would interfere with desensitization and result in greater anxiety levels 
(Asmundson et al., 1999).  Attentional bias toward threat such as pain may act as an 
anxiety regulatory mechanism by fostering the early detection of distress-promoting 
experiences (e.g., Mathews and Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998, 1999). 
The relation of greater physical threat attentional bias to lower levels of physical 
anxiety symptoms in patients with RAP contrasts with positive relations expected based 
on studies from the chronic pain and anxiety disorder literatures.  Several studies using a 
Stroop task demonstrated a positive relation of anxiety symptoms to color-naming 
interference effects for pain words in adult pain patients (Snider et al., 2000; Pincus et al., 
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1998) or social threat words in adults with an anxiety disorder (Mogg et al., 1992).  Using 
a dot probe task, a positive relation of anxiety symptoms to bias for pain words was 
found for pain patients (Asmundson et al., 2005; Boyer, et al., 2006), and for social threat 
words in a study of anxious adults (Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989).  However, other 
studies of adult pain patients have not found a relation of anxiety symptoms to color-
naming interference effects of pain words (Crombez et al., 2000) or to attentional bias for 
pain words (Asmundson et al., 1997; Roelofs, Peters, Fassaert, Vlaeyen, 2005).  
Furthermore, studies of anxious children have found inconsistent relations of anxiety 
severity to dot probe or Stroop task responses to threat words, with two studies failing to 
demonstrate a significant association in children with an anxiety disorder (Taghavi, 
Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 1999; Taghavi, Dalgleish, Moradi, Neshat-
Doost, & Yule, 2003) and one study showing a negative relation of anxiety levels to 
attentional bias for threat in children with high levels of test anxiety (Vasey et al., 1996).  
Thus, the relation of anxiety symptom severity to attentional interference or bias to 
physical threat words has not been well established, and future attentional studies of 
patients with chronic pain are needed to clarify the relation of anxiety symptoms to 
attentional bias for physical threat.  
Despite the inconsistent research to date on the relation of physical threat 
attentional bias to anxiety, the negative relation found in this study could be viewed as 
support for the theory that physical threat attentional bias is specific to chronic pediatric 
pain and not due to general anxiety alone.  First, supraliminal attentional bias for physical 
threat was not related to other forms of child-reported anxiety (e.g., social anxiety).  In 
addition, attentional bias toward supraliminal social threat was inversely related to 
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parent-reported internalizing symptoms and social problems, and not physical anxiety 
symptoms, demonstrating specificity of relations of bias to anxiety symptoms within the 
physical and social threat domains.  This pattern of associations between attentional bias 
for threat and related anxiety symptoms and its divergence from results of studies of 
attentional bias in anxiety disorders provide preliminary support for the specificity of bias 
for physical threat in patients with RAP.  Previous investigations of the relation of 
anxiety to threat bias in chronic pain populations may have yielded mixed results due to 
the focus on general anxiety symptoms.  Child-report of physical anxiety symptoms, 
which may be more relevant to chronic pain disorders than general anxiety symptoms, 
must be included in future attentional bias studies in order to investigate this possibility.  
The lack of association found for attentional bias to other forms of child-reported 
anxiety symptoms (i.e., social anxiety and separation anxiety) in patients with RAP 
contrasts with the significant relations found for Well children.  Specifically, Well 
children demonstrated low but significant negative associations of supraliminal and 
subliminal social threat attentional bias to social and separation anxiety symptoms, 
respectively.  These findings provide added support for the relation of results from this 
laboratory measure of attentional bias for threat to well-validated questionnaire measures 
of anxiety.  Also, the difference between patients with RAP and Well participants in the 
relation of physical versus other anxiety symptoms to attentional bias for physical versus 
social threat provides support for the theory that attentional orienting for physical threat 
operates differently in patients with RAP than pain-free children.     
Finally, attentional bias for physical threat was negatively related to the degree to 
which patients perceived their pain condition to be serious.  That is, patients who 
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believed their chronic pain condition to be more serious demonstrated greater attentional 
avoidance of supraliminally presented physical threat, and patients who believed their 
condition to be less serious demonstrated greater attention toward supraliminally 
presented physical threat.  The association between physical threat attentional bias and 
pain severity beliefs is consistent with theories (e.g., Eccleston & Crombez, 1999) and 
preliminary evidence (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) that threat is important in determining 
the extent to which pain attracts attention.  At first, the direction of this relation appears 
different from the relation proposed by Eccleston and Crombez, who suggest that greater 
perceived pain threat is related to greater attentional interruption by pain.  However, it is 
possible that, in the context of the dot probe task, participants who believe that their 
illness is more serious perceived more threat in the physical threat words, which may 
have facilitated attentional interruption by physical threat words and triggered subsequent 
avoidance of it in an attempt to manage related distress.  Conversely, patients who 
believe their illness to be less serious may perceive less threat in physical threat words 
and therefore experience less or later interruption in response to viewing them on the 
screen. The lower threat value may not have triggered attentional avoidance of these 
words.  Additional research involving pain beliefs, perception of physical threat, 
attentional orienting, and coping styles (e.g., tendency to respond to pain and stress with 
avoidance) is needed to investigate these possibilities and their implications for patients’ 
experience of RAP.  
Attentional bias to subliminally presented physical threat words was not related to 
anxiety or pain threat beliefs for patients with RAP.  This contrasts with expectations that 
subliminal attention to physical threat would be related to anxiety and pain threat 
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perception, but is consistent with other investigations of subliminal pain attentional bias 
and anxiety (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006; Snider et al., 2000).  This area requires 
further research; other pain-related words and/or different subliminal exposure levels may 
be more appropriate for identifying relations of subliminal threat bias to pain beliefs and 
psychological distress in children with RAP.   
In addition, neither subliminal nor supraliminal physical threat attentional bias 
was related to parent-reported frequency of somatic symptoms on the CBCL.  Few 
published studies have measured the correlation of pain severity to attentional bias for 
physical threat, and those that have examined this relation have demonstrated mixed 
results.  Specifically, Boyer and colleagues (2006) found a positive relation between 
attention toward pain words and pain, and Crombez and colleagues (2000) found a 
positive relation between color-naming latency of Stroop task pain words and pain 
severity.  Conversely, neither Pincus and colleagues (1998) nor Snider and colleagues 
(2000) found a relation between color-naming latency of Stroop task pain words and pain 
severity.  Additional research into the relations of attentional bias for physical threat to 
pain experience is needed to clarify these associations.  Future research should 
specifically assess the frequency and intensity of patients’ pain episodes to understand the 
implications of physical threat attentional bias for patients’ pain experiences. 
The relation of attentional bias to temporal and demographic features of the study 
and its participants were examined to investigate alternative explanations of threat bias 
and explore developmental and gender trends in attentional bias.  Results indicated that 
age and gender were not related to attentional bias scores for patients with RAP.  
Similarly, Boyer and colleagues (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006) did not find a relation 
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between attentional bias and patients’ demographic characteristics.  Nonetheless, future 
studies should continue to investigate potential relations of gender and age to attentional 
bias for threat to discern whether this finding will be replicated in other samples.   
For the RAP group, attention toward subliminal physical threat and a trend for 
attention toward subliminal social threat were inversely related to the number of days 
between patients’ initial clinic visits and their participation in the dot probe task.  Thus, 
when words were presented outside of conscious awareness, patients who completed the 
task closer in time to their clinic appointment demonstrated greater attentional bias 
toward threat words than patients for whom more time had passed between the dot probe 
task and their clinic appointment.  This relation was not observed in Boyer’s study of 
patients with RAP (Boyer, 2002; Boyer et al., 2006).  As discussed above, pediatric and 
adult patients with clinical anxiety disorders show greater attention toward threat than 
non-anxious individuals (e.g., MacCleod et al., 1986).  For children with RAP, medical 
examinations by a pediatric gastroenterologist may be associated with heightened 
anxiety, and this anxiety may be related to greater attention toward subliminal threat.  
Patients in this study were informed at the time of their initial clinic appointment or 
shortly afterward that there was no organic cause for their pain.   This information may 
have been associated with a reduction in anxiety and accompanying decrease in 
attentional bias toward threat over time.   
In addition, completion of the dot probe task at earlier hours of the day was 
associated with greater attention toward supraliminal physical threat words for patients 
with RAP.  This association also was reported in Boyer’s study (2002).  Clinical 
observations of RAP suggest that patients experience more abdominal distress during the 
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morning than the afternoon or evening (Walker & Johnson, 2004).  Patients’ bias toward 
physical threat at earlier hours may be related to the greater frequency of abdominal pain 
episodes during these hours.  Additional research is necessary to understand the 
association between bias for supraliminal physical threat words and time of task 
completion, which was replicated across studies despite other differences in outcomes.     
 
Conclusions, Limitations and Future Directions 
This study tested components of a model that proposes a relation among pain 
severity beliefs, attentional orienting toward physical threat, and the frequency and 
severity of pain episodes.  Results showed that patients with RAP demonstrated bias 
toward physical threat, and that more serious pain beliefs were related to greater attention 
toward physical threat.  In contrast, support was not found for the hypothesized relation 
of greater attentional bias to more pain and somatic symptoms.  This may be due to the 
lack of child-report measures of the frequency and severity of patients’ pain and somatic 
symptoms.  Pain information was not obtained from children in an attempt to avoid 
priming their attention toward physical threat words on the dot probe task or toward 
greater symptom reporting after they read physical threat words during the task (cf. 
Lundh & Czyzykow-Czarnocka, 2001).  Future studies should obtain patient ratings of 
pain frequency and severity on a different day than the study or following a distractor 
task after the study in order to supplement parent-reported measures of pain and somatic 
symptoms.  Symptoms also could be assessed several weeks to months following the dot 
probe task to investigate whether pain-related attentional bias predicts maintenance of 
pain and somatic symptoms.   
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Also, assessment of patients’ coping strategies and other responses to pain and 
pain-related disability would provide a more comprehensive picture of the context in 
which patients experience pain episodes and how attentional bias is related to disability.  
Researchers have suggested that biases to attend toward pain may reflect children’s lack 
of abilities to shift attention away from stressors and toward effective coping strategies 
for dealing with it, resulting in higher levels of pain and disability (e.g., Compas & 
Boyer, 2001; Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997).  However, in this study, biases toward 
physical threat were related to lower levels of physical anxiety symptoms, suggesting that 
attentional bias toward pain may be adaptive.  Consistent with the negative relation of 
physical threat bias to physical anxiety symptoms, a study of women with breast cancer 
found that greater attention toward cancer-related words was related to lower levels of 
emotional distress (Glinder, Beckjord, Kaiser, & Compas, 2006).  The authors suggested 
that selective attention to threat may represent a first step in seeking out information that 
can be used in a more cognitively complex form of coping, such as acceptance of one’s 
situation or cognitive restructuring.  Additional research addressing coping and disability 
will help identify the nature and long-term implications of attentional bias to physical 
threat in RAP, and will help guide treatment. 
As a group, patients with RAP demonstrated attentional bias toward physical 
threat, yet some patients demonstrated a tendency to avoid physical threat.  The relation 
of attentional avoidance of physical threat to higher levels of physical anxiety symptoms 
and beliefs that their pain condition is more serious suggests that some patients with RAP 
could benefit from treatment that addresses attentional orienting for physical threat.  The 
relation of attention toward physical threat to lower levels of physical anxiety symptoms 
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and less severe beliefs regarding their chronic pain condition suggests that attentional 
bias toward physical threat appears to be related to more accurate and helpful cognitions 
and less distress.  Future research must address pain outcomes and disability associated 
with attentional bias toward physical threat before conclusions about bias toward physical 
threat can be made. 
In addition, the context of attentional bias should be investigated with respect to 
stress.  A daily diary study found that patients with RAP, when compared with pain-free 
children, responded to stressors with equal levels of negative affect but greater levels of 
somatization symptoms (Walker et al., 2001).  Thus, patients with RAP may show more 
attentional bias toward physical threat words when under stressful conditions than Well 
children or than they would in low stress conditions.  This concept is currently under 
investigation using the dot probe task after a stress-inducing activity (Walker, et al., 
2001). 
The current findings regarding attentional bias to physical threat in patients with 
RAP provide support for theories suggesting that RAP is characterized by a attentional 
bias toward pain and difficulty with disengaging attention from pain.  Investigations of 
attentional bias to physical threat in disorders involving abdominal pain related to 
biological pathology (e.g., Crohn’s disease) as well as other chronic pain disorders (e.g., 
sickle cell disease pain) would address questions regarding whether attentional bias for 
physical threat is specific to functional abdominal pain or whether the etiologies of 
chronic pain and attentional bias for physical threat are unrelated.  Furthermore, 
examination of attentional bias in groups of patients with other pediatric illness and 
disease (e.g., diabetes, cystic fibrosis) would provide insight into whether the differences 
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between patients with RAP and Well participants observed in this study are due to 
chronic pain per se or to the associated features of chronic illness in children (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001).   
The predominantly cross-sectional nature of this study limits the conclusions that 
can be drawn regarding the development of attentional bias and causes of functional 
RAP.  In contrast, one prospective study of a clinical population demonstrated that 
attentional bias to threat was related to later development of emotional distress following 
a cancer diagnosis (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992), providing support for theories suggesting 
that attentional bias to threat contributes to development of somatic or emotional 
difficulties.   Despite the lack of information addressing causality in the current study, 
results are consistent with the theory that children with RAP demonstrate unique biases 
for pain-related information (Zeltzer, Bursch, et al., 1997; Zeltzer, Bush, et al., 1997).  To 
address questions regarding causality, future studies could examine bias for physical 
threat in children presenting to their primary care physician with abdominal pain 
complaints and investigate whether attentional bias for physical threat predicts symptom 
maintenance over time. 
While modifications to threat stimuli and some procedures were made in this 
study to improve the design over other attentional bias studies, these changes add to the 
heterogeneity of attentional bias study methodologies and prevent clear comparisons of 
findings across studies.  Use of the dot probe task to measure attentional bias to physical 
threat improves upon modified Stroop tasks in that attentional engagement toward threat 
versus avoidance of threat can be assessed.  However, it cannot be determined whether 
the attentional engagement with physical threat observed in this study reflects facilitated 
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attentional engagement to threat or difficulties disengaging attention from threat (e.g., 
Koster et al., 2006).  Future research should attempt to replicate this study’s findings as 
well as consider using other paradigms that address engagement and disengagement 
features of attentional orienting, such as an exogenous cueing task (e.g., Koster et al., 
2006).   
Social threat words were used in this study in an attempt to test whether patients  
with RAP are biased only to attend to physical threat or to any type of threatening 
information.  However, social threat may be as relevant as physical threat for patients 
with RAP, who often miss school and other opportunities to develop age-appropriate 
relationships with peers, and for whom lower levels of social competence have been 
shown to be related to higher levels of symptom complaints (Walker et al., 1994).  In 
fact, this study showed that patients demonstrated more attentional bias toward 
subliminal social threat than Well participants.  The extent of subliminal social threat 
attentional bias was not significantly different from a neutral attentional stance, 
suggesting that this bias is less robust than attentional bias demonstrated by patients with 
RAP for supraliminal physical threat.  Nonetheless, future investigations of the 
specificity of attentional bias for physical threat in this population should include another 
comparison category of negative words that are less relevant to RAP, such as accident-
related words (Boyer, 2002).   
Another limitation of the study concerns the neutral words that were matched with 
threat words.  These words were not from a particular category, and included different 
parts of speech (see Table 1).  In an attentional bias study using the Stroop task, Mogg 
and colleagues found that, compared to non-anxious adults, anxious adults were slower in 
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color naming uncategorized versus categorized neutral words in the supraliminal 
condition (Mogg et al., 1993).  Thus, attentional bias patterns in this study may reflect the 
tendency for participants to attend toward category-relevant words, in this case, 
supraliminal physical threat words.  However, bias toward categorized words was not 
found in the supraliminal social threat condition, making the possibility that attentional 
bias patterns observed in this study reflect participants’ tendency to attend toward 
category-relevant words less plausible.  Nonetheless, the effect cannot be ruled out 
without further investigation in children using the dot probe task.   
Findings from this study do not include data from children ages eight and nine, 
whose attentional bias scores appeared irregular when compared with scores from 
children ten and older.  Kindt and Van Den Hout (2001) propose that information 
processing biases in childhood are dependent on a child’s ability to inhibit attention to 
threat.  In their review of attentional bias studies in children with varying levels of 
anxiety, they suggest that attentional bias toward threat is prevalent in younger children 
regardless of anxiety levels, and that the ability to inhibit attention toward threat develops 
at approximately age ten in non-anxious children.  Thus, younger patients with RAP may 
not differ from pain-free children in their attentional orienting toward physical threat.  If 
so, this would suggest that attentional bias for physical threat does not play a role in the 
development of RAP, at least in children younger than ten, and may instead develop as a 
consequence of RAP.  Additional prospective research with young children with RAP is 
necessary to explore this issue further. 
In conclusion, this study provides evidence to support the theory that patients with 
RAP are biased to attend toward physical threat, and that this attentional bias is specific 
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to the experience of chronic pain.  Attentional bias toward physical threat words appears 
adaptive in that it was related to lower levels of physical anxiety symptoms and to beliefs 
that their chronic pain condition was less serious.  Parental report of the frequency of 
patients’ pain and somatic symptoms was not related to attentional bias toward physical 
threat; future studies should include patient report of pain, somatic symptoms and 
disability to further investigate the implications of attentional bias toward physical threat.  
The current findings require replication and further investigation particularly given 
inconsistencies in the attentional bias and chronic pain literature to date.  Furthermore, 
prospective studies are needed to investigate whether attentional bias contributes to the 
development of RAP, and the long-term implications it may have for continued pain, 
disability and related distress.  
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